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Abstract 
 
Humans are a social species with the internal capability to process social information 
from other humans. To understand others’ behavior and to react accordingly, it is 
necessary to infer their internal states, emotions and aims, which are conveyed by subtle 
nonverbal bodily cues such as postures, gestures, and facial expressions. This thesis 
investigates the brain functions underlying the processing of such social information. 
Studies I and II of this thesis explore the neural basis of perceiving pain from another 
person’s facial expressions by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
and magnetoencephalography (MEG). In Study I, observing another’s facial expression 
of pain activated the affective pain system (previously associated with self-experienced 
pain) in accordance with the intensity of the observed expression. The strength of the 
response in anterior insula was also linked to the observer’s empathic abilities. The 
cortical processing of facial pain expressions advanced from the visual to temporal-lobe 
areas at similar latencies (around 300–500 ms) to those previously shown for emotional 
expressions such as fear or disgust. Study III shows that perceiving a yawning face is 
associated with middle and posterior STS activity, and the contagiousness of a yawn 
correlates negatively with amygdalar activity. 
 Study IV explored the brain correlates of interpreting social interaction between two 
members of the same species, in this case human and canine. Observing interaction 
engaged brain activity in very similar manner for both species. Moreover, the body and 
object sensitive brain areas of dog experts differentiated interaction from non-
interaction in both humans and dogs — whereas in the control subjects, similar 
differentiation occurred only for humans. Finally, Study V shows the engagement of the 
brain area associated with biological motion when exposed to the sounds produced by a 
single human being walking. However, more complex pattern of activation, with the 
walking sounds of several persons, suggests that as the social situation becomes more 
complex so does the brain response. 
 Taken together, these studies demonstrate the roles of distinct cortical and 
subcortical brain regions in the perception and sharing of others’ internal states via 
facial and bodily gestures, and the connection of brain responses to behavioral 
attributes. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Ihminen on sosiaalinen laji, ja meillä onkin erikoistuneita aivomekanismeja 
kanssaihmistemme välittämän sosiaalisen informaation käsittelyyn. Ymmärtääksemme 
muiden käyttäytymistä ja vastataksemme siihen tarkoituksenmukaisesti, meidän täytyy 
ymmärtää muiden ihmisten hienovaraisen kehonkielen — kuten eleiden tai 
kasvonilmeiden — välittämiä tunnetiloja ja päämääriä. Tässä väitöskirjatyössä tutkittiin 
tällaisen sosiaalisen informaation käsittelyä aivoissa. Väitöskirja tarkastelee 
aivotoimintaa toisten ihmisten tunnetilojen havainnoinnissa kasvojen ja kehon eleiden 
kautta sekä näiden aivovasteiden yhteyttä käyttäytymiseen. 
 Osatöissä I ja II tarkasteltiin toisen ihmisen kipukokemuksen havaitsemista 
kasvonilmeistä toiminnallisen magneettikuvauksen (fMRI) ja magnetoenkefalografian 
(MEG) avulla. Tutkimuksissa selvisi, että toisen ihmisen kivun kasvonilmettä 
katsottaessa ne aivoalueet, jotka osallistuvat myös itse koettuun kipuun, aktivoituivat 
sitä voimakkaammin, mitä voimakkaampaa kipua kasvonilmeen arveltiin välittävän. 
Aivoaktivaatio oli myös yhteydessä katselijan empatiakykyihin. Kipuilmeiden käsittely 
eteni näköaivokuorelta ohimolohkon alueille samassa ajassa kuin on aikaisemmin 
osoitettu pelon ja inhon ilmeille (noin 300–500 ms). Osatyössä III osoitettiin, että myös 
haukottelevien kasvojen havaitseminen aktivoi ohimolohkon alueita. Tulokset osoittivat 
myös, että mitä heikompaa mantelitumakkeen aktivaatio oli havainnon aikana, sitä 
enemmän koehenkilö tunsi tarvetta haukotella itse katsellessaan haukottelevia kasvoja. 
 Osatyössä IV tutkittiin vuorovaikutuksen havaitsemista kahden ihmisen tai kahden 
koiran sosiaalisista eleistä. Kummankin lajin vuorovaikutuseleiden katselu aktivoi 
aivoja samankaltaisesti, mutta koirien elekieleen perehtyneiden asiantuntijoiden 
aivovasteet kehon ja muiden havaintokohteiden käsittelyyn erikoistuneilla alueilla 
erottelivat koirien vuorovaikutustilanteet ei-vuorovaikutteisista tilanteista samaan 
tapaan kuin ihmisten väliset vastaavat tilanteet. Sen sijaan kontrollikoehenkilöiden 
aivovasteet erottelivat samalla tavalla vain ihmisten vuorovaikutuksen. 
 Osatyössä V osoitettiin, että biologisen liikkeen havaitsemiseen erikoistunut aivoalue 
(pSTS) aktivoituu yhden ihmisen kävelyääniä kuunnellessa, mutta aktivaatiokuvio 
leviää kuunneltaessa usean ihmisen kävelyääniä, mikä viittaa aivovasteiden 
monimutkaistumiseen riippuen sosiaalisesta ympäristöstä.  
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1 Introduction 
 
"Human is the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things 
which are not, that they are not." 
Protagoras (~450 BC), referred to by Plato 
 
We humans reflect the outside world to ourselves: our perception is limited, we realize 
external measures with respect to our physical dimensions, and we even compare and 
understand other humans through our own experiences. It may be challenging to 
visualize the possible borders of the universe and the nothingness beyond; it is often 
much easier to see the happiness of our friend and share the joy. We are inherently 
social mammals, and in the past, have relied to the tight collaboration with the peers in 
order to survive (the term “social” here referring to the biological humane ability and 
interest for understanding the doings of others instead of a personality feature). The key 
features mediating effective social functioning are inter-individual similarity (Hodges et 
al., 2010) and synchrony (Hove & Risen, 2009): the more similar we are, the better we 
understand each other, and the more synchronized our time scales are, the more we can 
share. Thus, from the point of social sharing, being “in the right place at the right time” 
is of high importance. To comprehend others’ behavior and to react accordingly, it is 
necessary to infer their internal states, emotions and aims, which are conveyed by subtle 
nonverbal bodily cues, such as postures, gestures, and facial expressions. 
 Understanding human social nonverbal communication goes through many levels: it 
arises from perceiving the body postures, smiles and frowns of the conspecifics, as well 
as interpreting the gazes of eyes, tones of voices and tensions of muscles. Some of these 
features are processed effortlessly and unconsciously in our brains — one’s awareness 
of them may even hamper the interaction — but some social cues require both 
unconscious and conscious processing. A facial expression can be understood by a 
conspecific without requiring further analysis of the sight, but sometimes more 
elaborate conscious processing of the internal goals and purposes of another person is 
needed. These two, social perception and social cognition, go hand in hand in our 
everyday social interactions, and they are processed within a network of distributed 
brain areas working in parallel. 
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 The most crucial mediator of human social functioning is perhaps the face, and the 
processing of faces is strongly associated with a network of specific regions within the 
human brain. Along with faces, whole bodies are important for gestural communication, 
providing the means of acquiring one’s goals as well as a tool for interaction. People’s 
emotional states are reflected in and recognized from their bodily postures and gestures, 
and their goals can be deduced from their movements and actions. This thesis explores 
human social cognition from the perspectives of sharing others’ experiences via facial 
expressions (Studies I–III), body postures or movements (Studies IV–V), the role of 
expertise in interpreting communicational gestures across species (Study IV), and 
perceiving one or multiple persons concurrently (Study V). 
 Despite the experimental research on basic facial expressions of emotions that are 
recognized universally (Ekman et al., 1969), facial gestures outside this category have 
not attracted wide scientific attention. In Studies I–III, we explored the neural basis of 
such “non-emotional”, yet meaningful, facial expressions associated with pain and 
contagious yawning. First, we asked how humans can “feel” someone else’s pain 
merely by observing another’s facial expression of pain; and how the strength of the 
observed pain or the empathic abilities of the observer affect the observer’s brain 
responses (Study I). Second, we clarified the detailed temporal progression of the 
cortical responses to another’s facial pain expressions with magnetoencephalography 
(Study II). Third, we explored the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying the 
contagiousness of yawning (Study III). 
 Experience is known to enhance the brain responses in a variety of perceptual 
settings. However, it has not been previously assessed whether experience on social 
gestures of another species affects the respective brain function, or whether the neural 
correlates of perceiving social interaction of other species are similar than when 
perceiving conspecifics. This kind of expansion of social perception through expertise 
was explored in Study IV. 
 Finally, social gestures are most often studied with perception of one person at a 
time, whereas in real life, we often perceive multiple agents concurrently. We 
approached this topic by exploring how the human brain represents perceiving one 
person walking alone or multiple persons walking together (Study V). 
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 This thesis begins with a presentation of the foundations of social cognition in the 
human brain. Different subareas of social perception and cognition are introduced in 
detail, followed by the specific aims of the studies and the experimental methods used 
in this thesis. Thereafter, each experiment is briefly introduced and discussed, and 
finally these results are set in a more general context of social brain research. 
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2 Background 
 
Humans are born with sensitivity for social information: newborn infants attend to 
object combinations resembling faces more than other stimuli (Johnson et al., 1991), 
and copy the facial expressions of others (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Thus, some 
biological prerequisites for social perception are already present in infant brain, 
although social cognition is modified throughout life. 
 Social cues within the environment are first mediated through sensory areas of the 
brain, and further processed in brain regions that gather information at different 
perceptual and cognitive levels. Subprocesses of social cognition associate our own 
experiences with those of others (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Hein & Singer, 2008; 
Hari & Kujala, 2009), and evaluate social cues (Allison et al., 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003; Blakemore & Frith, 2004; Frith & Frith, 2006). Together, the brain areas 
associated with these functions form a network for processing social information 
(Figure 1; Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. Key brain areas processing social information. Perception of facial and bodily gestures is 
associated with superior temporal sulcus (A), recognition of faces with fusiform gyrus (B), integration of 
emotion and perception with temporal poles (C), evaluation of social interaction with medial prefrontal 
cortex and frontal pole (D), shared sensory states with cingulate cortex (E) and insula (K; within the 
Sylvian fissure), emotional modulation with orbitofrontal cortex (F), emotions with amygdala (G), theory 
of mind with temporo-parietal junction (H), and motor mirroring with inferior parietal cortex (I), inferior 
frontal cortex, and premotor areas (J). Adapted from Beauchamp & Anderson (2010) with permission 
from American Psychological Association. 
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2.1 Processing of facial features 
Face is perhaps the most important medium for social communication: face informs 
others of the person’s identity and his or her emotions, feelings, intentions, impressions, 
motivations and even internal states such as excitement or anxiety. The movement and 
direction of a face and gaze provide information of a person’s attention and interests, 
and following these social cues transmitted by another person enables us to momentarily 
share their perception of the world. 
 Studies I–III of this thesis concerned gestural cues transmitted by faces, and although 
the early visual perception or recognition of faces were not the specific targets of this 
thesis, perception of faces per se forms the basis for evaluation of the changing social 
cues of facial expressions. Thus, the early stages in cerebral processing of face 
perception are reviewed first, before introduction of facial expressions. 
 
2.1.1  Perception of faces 
Processing of faces, as well as any visual information of our surroundings, begins in the 
retina of the eyes, where the visual input is already spatially segregated and 
retinotopically organized. Subsequently, it advances along the visual pathway through 
the optic nerve and optic tract to lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, and reaches 
the cerebral cortex in the most posterior part of the brain, the occipital lobe. The 
primary visual cortex in the occipital lobe is located around the calcarine sulcus, and 
processing of faces continues in the several adjacent, functionally segregated regions. 
Although the visually observed social information requires bottom-up processing from 
lower-level visual areas, our visual awareness of is also affected by expectations built 
on the basis of previous experience, guiding our attentional resources and motivations 
(e.g. Connor et al., 2004; Berman et al., 2008). 
 After the early visual processing, the visual analysis of faces is conducted within the 
occipito-temporal regions in the extrastriate visual cortices: inferior occipital gyrus 
(IOG), lateral fusiform gyrus, and the cortex around the superior temporal sulcus, STS 
(Figure 2; for reviews, see Allison et al., 2000; Haxby et al., 2000; Haxby et al., 2002). 
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Figure 2. Cortical activation during fMRI measurement associated with the perception of faces. Brain 
areas shown in red to yellow responded more to faces than houses, and the blue regions responded more 
to houses than faces. Top: lateral views of the left and right cortical surfaces. The next row shows the 
cortical surfaces tilted back 45o to show both the lateral and ventral surfaces of the brain. The next rows 
show the cortical surfaces inflated to open the sulci and flattened into a two-dimensional sheet. Adapted 
from Haxby et al. (2000) with permission from Elsevier. 
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 A region within the lateral fusiform gyrus shows stronger responses to faces than to 
any other visual stimuli, highly consistently across studies (e.g. Sergent et al., 1992; 
Allison et al., 1994; Haxby et al., 1994; Puce et al., 1995; Kanwisher et al., 1997; 
Halgren et al., 1999; Ishai et al., 1999; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). Accordingly, it has 
been named “fusiform face area” (FFA, Kanwisher et al., 1997). The precise function of 
the FFA has been under an continuous debate for over a decade, including views of the 
region as either a specialized module for face perception (Kanwisher et al., 1997; 
McCarthy et al., 1997) or as a module specialized for visual expertise (Gauthier et al., 
1999). 
 In single-cell recordings of the monkey brain, face-selective neurons have been 
found within the temporal cortex (Perrett et al., 1982). Many of these neurons respond 
primarily to either identity or expression: the identity-sensitive cells being present 
mainly in the inferior temporal cortex, and the expression-sensitive cells in the STS 
(Hasselmo et al., 1989a). According to human brain imaging, the putative human 
homologues for these regions are the lateral fusiform gyrus and STS (Puce et al., 1998; 
Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). 
 A cortical model for face perception, based on monkey experiments and the 
respective data on the human brain function (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000), divides face 
perception into processing of invariant and changeable aspects of faces. According to 
the model, the face-responsive area in the fusiform gyrus is responsive to the perception 
of identity through invariant facial features, STS for the analysis of changeable aspects 
within facial expressions and gaze direction that are important for social interaction, and 
IOG as an information transfer site between the two (Haxby et al., 2000; Haxby et al., 
2002). The face-responsive area within IOG is a subsection of a more general object-
processing area, lateral occipital complex (LOC, Malach et al., 1995), and in some 
studies, it is called occipital face area (OFA, Gauthier et al., 2000b). The OFA region 
has been suggested to participate in the recognition of faces (Steeves et al., 2006; 
Pitcher et al., 2007; Rhodes et al., 2009). 
 However, the cortical model for facial perception does not fully cover face 
processing. Even a newborn infant attends to facial configurations more than other 
similar stimuli (Johnson et al., 1991), although the adult-like pathways and the cortical 
representation of faces are not mature at birth. Attention to faces by infants is better 
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explained by a dual route of face processing: a quick subcortical representation for 
facial features with low spatial frequencies in the pulvinar – superior colliculus – 
amygdala route, and a slower cortical representation for facial features with high spatial 
frequencies culminating in the cortical face-responsive areas (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). 
The subcortical pathway for the low spatial frequency information is functional at birth 
whereas the cortical route is not, suggesting that the newborn looking preferences rely 
on the subcortical route (Johnson, 2005). 
 Adult-like cortical representations for faces start to mature at 3 months. At that time, 
stronger brain responses to faces than other objects are observed around 290 ms from 
the stimulus onset in EEG measurements (Halit et al., 2004) — resembling the adults’ 
face-sensitive responses that peak around 170 ms (140–200 ms in different studies) in 
the temporo-occipital cortex (e.g. Allison et al., 1994; Sams et al., 1997; Puce et al., 
1999; Halgren et al., 2000; Tanskanen et al., 2005). In adults, cortical face responses 
emerge with stimulus durations as short as 50–200 ms (Tanskanen et al., 2007), and the 
strength of the 170-ms temporo-occipital face responses correspond to the subjects’ 
performance on face recognition (Tanskanen et al., 2005; Tanskanen et al., 2007). 
 
2.1.2  Facial expressions: emotion, movement, and gestures 
Besides more rigid information on identity, gender and even health, faces also provide a 
rich source of temporally varying information about the inner affective states and 
emotions of other people. Classically, six basic emotions are recognized from faces 
across cultures: happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger, and disgust (Ekman et al., 
1969). Facial expressions of emotions are thought to be somewhat automatic displays, 
occurring as a direct function of the emotional experience of the individual (Darwin, 
1872; Ekman, 1997). Emotional expressions have also been proposed to serve a social 
communicatory function in transmitting the valence of novel objects or situations 
between conspecifics (Blair, 2003). Supporting the second view of the social function, 
although not denying the first, our facial expressions (provoked by external social 
stimuli) are stronger when we are accompanied by other people (Malatesta & Haviland, 
1982; Chovil, 1991; Fridlund, 1991). 
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 The face perception model by Haxby and colleagues (2000) proposes that perceiving 
facial expressions (of emotions or other gestures) requires extraction of the facial 
features that can vary with movement (muscle contractions and flexions), and the 
involvement of the emotional-affective system. In agreement with the findings on the 
monkey brain (reviewed in Perrett et al., 1989), both extracellular intracranial recording 
(Ojemann et al., 1992) and human brain imaging studies have shown that the regions 
around STS are sensitive to many kinds of social information, including static emotional 
expressions of faces (Phillips et al., 1997; Vuilleumier et al., 2003; Winston et al., 2004; 
Engell & Haxby, 2007; Furl et al., 2007), gaze direction (Wicker et al., 1998; Hoffman 
& Haxby, 2000; Pageler et al., 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2004; Calder et al., 2007; Engell & 
Haxby, 2007; Sato et al., 2008; Nummenmaa et al., 2009) and perceived movement of 
either faces (Puce & Allison, 1999; Sato et al., 2004; Simon et al., 2006), eyes (Puce et 
al., 1998), mouth (Calvert et al., 1997; Puce et al., 1998; Nishitani & Hari, 2002), hands 
(Grezes et al., 1999; Nishitani & Hari, 2000) or the whole body (e.g. Bonda et al., 
1996). 
 Although extensive literature exists on processing of emotional facial expressions, 
facial movement and eye gaze, studies of facial gestures other than the ones labeled as 
universal emotional expressions (Ekman et al., 1969; Ekman & Friesen, 1971) are still 
rare, although these gestures may also be socially meaningful. For example, a sight of a 
yawning face communicates decreased alertness of an individual and can cause other 
people to yawn, but the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon have remained 
unclear. Studies of I–III of this thesis explore the neural correlates of such socially 
meaningful yet “non-emotional” gestures: the expression of pain and the gestural 
sequence of yawning. 
 Studies on facial expressions using time-sensitive electrophysiological methods have 
also focused on the classically defined basic emotional expressions or simpler facial 
motion. The perception of happy, disgusted, surprised and fearful faces provoke 
commonly stronger brain responses than control stimuli in the occipital and temporal 
regions 250–750 ms after stimulus onset (Carretie & Iglesias, 1995; Krolak-Salmon et 
al., 2001; Morel et al., 2009) — although some reports exist of earlier 110 ms separation 
of emotional (happy or sad) from neutral faces in the occipital area (Halgren et al., 
2000). Eye or mouth movements irrespective of emotional content have been associated 
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with the temporo-occipital 170-ms responses (Watanabe et al., 2001; Miki et al., 2004). 
However, temporal correlates of brain responses are less well known for facial gestures 
that are not classified as basic emotional expressions. In Study II, we continued the 
exploration of such non-emotional gestures by characterizing the cortical activation 
sequence during observation of pain expressions. 
 In addition to brain structures specialized in face processing, facial expressions are 
also processed in the structures responsible for generating similar states in ourselves, 
such as and amygdala (regarding fear or threat) or anterior insula (regarding visceral 
sensations). Amygdala lesions are known to impair fear conditioning (Wilensky et al., 
2006), and they are also consistently associated with impairment in recognizing fear in 
others (Adolphs et al., 1994; Calder et al., 1996; Adolphs et al., 1999; Schmolck & 
Squire, 2001), whereas these lesions rarely result in impairment of happy expressions 
(Adolphs et al., 1999). Furthermore, numerous brain imaging studies have shown 
enhanced responses of amygdala when observing facial expressions that require 
heightened caution from the perceiver, such as facial expressions of fear (Breiter et al., 
1996; Morris et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1998), sadness (Blair et al., 1999) or even 
suggested untrustworthiness of the other person (Winston et al., 2002).  
 Non-invasive brain imaging studies indicate the reactivity of the anterior insula to 
facial expressions of disgust (Phillips et al., 1997; Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003; Wicker 
et al., 2003), intracortical recordings show the peak of insular responses for faces with 
disgust at 300–500 ms (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003), and patients with insular damage 
have impaired ability to recognize disgust (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Calder et al., 
2000). Knowledge of another’s pain is also associated with insular responses (Singer et 
al., 2004), and Study I further explored the possible connection of insular responses also 
to perception of pain from facial expressions. 
 
2.2 Body postures and gestures 
The internal states of animals are linked with specific bodily expressions and behavior 
(Panksepp, 1998). A perception of the bodies of other intentional agents can provide 
information on their dispositions to the environment, and the possible causes of their 
actions. Social cues mediated by bodily gestures and movement were examined in the 
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Studies IV–V of this thesis, thus the brain correlates for perception of bodies are 
introduced first, followed by the concept of biologically produced motion. 
 
2.2.1  Perception of bodies 
The perception of human bodies shares many features with the perception of faces — 
for example, both faces and bodies have a clear spatial configuration. Some form of 
body recognition seems to occur developmentally rather early, since ERP recordings of 
3-month-old infants show a decrease of P400 amplitude for configurationally distorted 
faces and bodies with respect to intact ones (Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005). Also in 
the first stages of adult perception, the overall configuration of bodies is extracted rather 
than details (Reed et al., 2003; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004), similarly as happens 
for faces (Valentine, 1988). Furthermore, observation of bodies consistently activates 
cortical regions of extrastriate body area (EBA) in the middle occipital gyrus (Downing 
et al., 2001) and fusiform body area (FBA) in the fusiform gyrus (Hadjikhani & de 
Gelder, 2003; Peelen & Downing, 2005b) more than other stimuli (Figure 3). The 
specific neural processing of body perception is suggested to be scattered in different 
brain areas depending on whether the processing of the posture, emotional expression, 
movement, or instrumental action is considered (de Gelder, 2006). 
 Emotions and sensations such as pain provoke distinctive facial expressions, but 
faces alone do not convey information about the cause of the emotion or sensation. In 
the natural social environment, facial expressions are accompanied by bodily gestures, 
which complement the information. A body can be detected from a distance, and it is 
sometimes enough to reveal the emotion of the actor. For example, fearful body 
expressions with faces blurred (compared with bodies gesturing a non-emotional action) 
activate areas processing emotional information (orbitofrontal cortex, anterior insula 
and nucleus accumbens), but also amygdala and right middle fusiform gyrus 
(Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003; de Gelder et al., 2004), which are also activated for 
facial expressions of fear alone (Morris et al., 1996). Observation of dynamical bodies 
expressing fear and anger, compared with neutral actions, activates the left amygdala 
and temporal cortices, as well as both ventrolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices 
(Grezes et al., 2007; Pichon et al., 2009). 
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Figure 3. Top: Examples of stimuli used for localizing the body-sensitive brain areas. Bottom: Body-
sensitive brain activation in the extrastriate body area (EBA) and fusiform body area (FBA) are shown in 
red-yellow, whereas the face-sensitive regions of occipital face area (OFA) and fusiform face area (FFA) 
shown in green. Adapted from Downing et al. (2001) and Taylor et al. (2007a) with permissions from The 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and The American Physiological Society. 
 
 Observation of bodies also produces an N170 response in the EEG (Stekelenburg & 
de Gelder, 2004), similarly as in face perception, although its amplitude seems 
somewhat smaller for bodies. Interestingly, perception of facial expressions of emotion 
is influenced by concurrently observed hand gestures (Hietanen & Leppänen, 2008), 
and incongruence between face and bodily expressions affects the brain responses 
within the first 100 ms of the perception (Meeren et al., 2005). 
 Thus, body-sensitive areas EBA and FBA respond consistently to the perception of 
bodies, but the analysis of specific bodily expressions seems to involve a wider neuronal 
network. The neural representation of emotional bodily expressions has been proposed 
to rely on two interconnected circuitries: a reflex-like system in the evolutionarily older 
subcortical structures and a cortical, more detailed recognition system, both of which 
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are modified through one’s own body experience and awareness through somatosensory 
information and interoception (de Gelder, 2006). 
 To date, the studies on perception of bodies or body parts have concentrated in 
characterizing the response properties of the EBA and FBA areas, but less is known 
about the extent of processing within these areas: whether they only serve as recognition 
areas, or whether they process also meaning of social gestures or motor acts (Astafiev et 
al., 2004; Peelen & Downing, 2005a). Furthermore, the stimuli commonly used in the 
studies are figures of single humans or body parts, and it is not known whether these 
body-selective brain areas also process social cues transmitted by bodily gestures during 
perception of more than one person at a time. Study IV of this thesis contributed to the 
topic by exploring brain activation while the subjects observed photos of social 
interaction between two people. 
 
2.2.2  Biological motion 
The term “biological motion” refers to forms of naturally moving humans or animals, 
which contain ecologically valid information (reviewed in e.g. Blakemore & Decety, 
2001; Puce & Perrett, 2003). The velocity profile of biological motion differs from the 
motion of non-biological origin (Kilner et al., 2007), making the movement of animals 
different from the environment. Biological motion can be perceived from a fully visible 
walking human, but also from mere “point-light” displays, where light sources have 
been attached to human walkers’ joints in the otherwise dark environment, thus leaving 
only the moving lights visible (Johansson, 1973). The unified movement of the lights is 
enough to create a rough perception of a moving body, e.g. a walking or running human 
(Figure 4) or an animal, implying perceptual converge of motion and form. 
 Biological motion can be perceived even when it has been masked with dots 
(Thornton et al., 1998), but inverting the display of a point-light walker disturbs the 
perception (Dittrich, 1993; Pavlova & Sokolov, 2000). Although biological motion 
representing locomotion appears to be recognized most efficiently, also emotional facial 
expressions or social and instrumental actions can be recognized via point-light displays 
(Bassili, 1978; Dittrich, 1993). 
 25
 The neural processing of biological motion shows similarities between monkeys and 
humans: in both species, the STS responds to a variety of natural social stimuli from 
faces to bodies. In macaque monkey, specific neurons in the anterior superior temporal 
polysensory area (STPa) respond to biological motion; the cells are selective for the 
sight of the same action either visible in full light or when inferred from the point-light 
displays (Perrett et al., 1990; Oram & Perrett, 1994; Oram & Perrett, 1996).  
 
 
Figure 4. Examples of biological motion stimuli produced by attaching light sources to the actor’s joints. 
Adapted from Johansson (1973) and Puce & Perrett (2003) with permissions from Psychonomic Society 
Publications and Royal Society Publishing. 
 
 In humans, the posterior STS responds most prominently to sights of biological 
motion, e.g. to body movement observed from either point-light displays (Bonda et al., 
1996; Grossman et al., 2000), facial eye and mouth motion (Puce et al., 1998), walking 
mannequins (Thompson et al., 2005), or animated walking humans (Pelphrey et al., 
2003). Observation of biological motion also engages the motion-sensitive area 
MT+/V5 in the occipito-temporal cortex similarly to non-biological motion stimuli such 
as moving circle gratings (Puce et al., 1998), arrays of dots (Grossman et al., 2000) or 
moving tools (Beauchamp et al., 2002). However, pSTS shows stronger responses for 
biological motion, whereas responses in MT+/V5 are more indifferent to the motion 
origins (Puce et al., 1998; Grossman et al., 2000; Beauchamp et al., 2002; Wheaton et 
al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2005).  
 The human perception of biological movement is also multimodal. Besides visually 
observed biological motion, the pSTS region is associated with listening to sounds of 
bodily movements and actions, such as footsteps (Bidet-Caulet et al., 2005), paper 
ripping, or gurgling (Gazzola et al., 2006). However these studies, as well as many other 
studies on biological motion, concentrate on the perception of single humans, whereas 
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the processing of concurrent perception of several moving agents is not well known.  
Study V of this thesis targeted this issue in the context of biological motion, by 
exploring the brain responses while the subjects were listening to sounds of humans 
walking either alone or together with another person. Furthermore, the stimuli of Study 
III contained dynamical biological motion of faces, and Studies II and IV included still 
snapshots of facial and bodily movements that can be interpreted as “implied motion”. 
 
2.3 Shared experiences and sensations 
We humans communicate our views of the world often unconsciously by automated, 
bodily means: we share our attention with someone by joint eye gaze, we share a part of 
our mental contents with others by our actions, and we share our affective-emotional 
states through our expressions. According to neuroscientific studies, the mechanisms 
that generate emotional or certain sensory states in persons themselves seem to be 
utilized also in the recognition of similar states in other persons (e.g. Hari & Kujala, 
2009). Such “mirroring”, first introduced within the motor domain in monkeys 
(Rizzolatti et al., 1996), seems to exist also for sensory-affective systems, and to play a 
part in social cognition by providing a route for relating to others’ experiences. Studies 
III and V of this thesis were discussed in relation to the motor mirror-neuron system and 
Study I concerned sensory mirroring of pain, thus the following chapters give some 
background on these subjects. 
 
2.3.1  Motor mirror-neuron system 
Although primarily associated with processing one’s motor output, motor brain areas 
also participate in social processing. The original monkey neurophysiological 
measurements revealed the existence of “mirror neurons”, which discharge both during 
execution and observation of a grasping action, located within the premotor F5 brain 
region (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), and in the parietal PF/7b region (Gallese et al., 2002). 
Direct intracranial data from the human homologues of these areas are not available, but 
in a recent single-neuron recording of human patients who were prepared for epilepsy 
surgery, neurons with mirroring properties — responding to both observation and 
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execution of the same actions — were found in supplementary motor area and 
hippocampus (Mukamel et al., 2010). 
 Action execution and perception have been shown to recruit similar motor brain 
areas, or modulate brain function similarly, also in studies of human brain imaging: in 
MEG (Hari et al., 1998; Nishitani & Hari, 2000; Nishitani & Hari, 2002), fMRI 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Buccino et al., 2001; Grezes et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004), 
EEG (Gastaut & Bert, 1954; Cochin et al., 1998), TMS (Fadiga et al., 1995; Strafella & 
Paus, 2000; Gangitano et al., 2001), and positron emission tomography (Grafton et al., 
1996). In humans, the “mirror-neuron system” for other’s actions contains inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), ventral premotor cortices and rostral inferior parietal lobule, which 
are associated with both action execution and observation, as well as STS, which is 
associated with action observation (reviewed in e.g. Hari & Nishitani, 2004; Iacoboni & 
Dapretto, 2006). 
 Since action sounds are processed in the premotor and motor cortices similarly to 
action vision, the motor mirror-neuron system is multimodal: this has been 
demonstrated in both monkey (Kohler et al., 2002; Keysers et al., 2003) and human 
studies (Gazzola et al., 2006; Caetano et al., 2007). The mirror responses also seem to 
contain somatotopical organization, since observing or listening to hand, mouth and foot 
actions activates the motor areas in a similar order than producing these actions oneself 
(Buccino et al., 2001; Gazzola et al., 2006). 
 
2.3.2  Sharing pain and other sensations 
Studying empathy for pain, Singer and colleagues (2004) measured fMRI brain 
responses during experimental pain caused either to the palm of the subjects themselves, 
or to the palm of their loved ones while the subjects observed the situation. The results 
showed activation of the ACC as well as the anterior insula (AI) during both felt and 
observed pain (Figure 5, Singer et al., 2004). Study I of this thesis explored the possible 
sensory mirroring of pain from facial expressions and the relation of brain responses to 
subjects’ estimates of pain intensity and their empathic abilities. Since the first studies, 
the results on sensory mirroring of pain have been replicated for photos of body parts 
(hands or legs) observed in painful situations (Jackson et al., 2005; Cheng et al., 2007; 
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Gu & Han, 2007; Lamm et al., 2007b; Morrison & Downing, 2007; Ogino et al., 2007; 
Benuzzi et al., 2008) and unfamiliar faces expressing pain (Botvinick et al., 2005; 
Simon et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007a), suggesting the mechanism to be generally 
related to perceiving pain of others. 
 To date, sensory mirroring of pain has been shown to be affected by the features of 
the person being observed (Singer et al., 2006), the observer (Cheng et al., 2007; 
Moriguchi et al., 2007; Valeriani et al., 2008; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010), attention to 
the pain (Gu & Han, 2007), and the situational context of pain (Lamm et al., 2007a; 
Akitsuki & Decety, 2009). Furthermore, also inter-individual differences in behavioral 
measures of empathy seem to modulate the brain responses for pain perceived in 
another: the higher the empathy scores, the higher the activation in AI and ACC (Singer 
et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). These results suggest that sensory mirroring of pain 
does not convey another’s sensations with similar precision as in self-experienced pain 
— thus it should perhaps be considered more as a quick insight on another’s internal 
state, filtered by our own individual differences. 
Figure 5. Left: Overlap of brain activation for experiencing painful stimuli oneself (Self pain vs. Self no 
pain), shown in green, and for receiving cues of another’s similar experiences (Other pain vs. Other no 
pain) shown in red. Right: Conjunction analysis between the contrast pain vs. no pain of self and other 
(Self pain vs. Self no pain AND Other pain vs. Other no pain) at p < 0.001. Adapted from Singer et al. 
(2004) with permission from The American Associationfor the Advancement of Science. 
 
 The brain areas most consistently participating in the shared pain experience, ACC 
and AI, have some similar functions: they both are involved in integrating autonomic 
and visceral information (Pool & Ransohoff, 1949; Mesulam & Mufson, 1982), 
awareness of bodily feelings, i.e. interoception (Craig, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004), 
error and conflict processing (e.g. Taylor et al., 2007b), and attention to self-
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experienced pain (Davis et al., 1997; Peyron et al., 1999; Longe et al., 2001; Bantick et 
al., 2002; Brooks et al., 2002). 
 In addition to the shared affect of pain, recent experiments using TMS suggest that 
the physical qualities of others’ pain might be mapped in the sensorimotor cortex. Video 
clips showing body parts in painful situations increased the amplitudes of 
somatosensory evoked potentials (at the latency of 45 ms), which reflect the activity of 
the primary somatosensory cortex (Bufalari et al., 2007). Interestingly, the modulation 
correlated with the intensity but not with the unpleasantness of the observed pain. In 
similar TMS experiments, the motor evoked potentials have been found to increase in 
amplitude during pain observation (Avenanti et al., 2005; Avenanti et al., 2006).  
 Although nowadays perhaps the most studied phenomenon in the context of shared 
sensations and sensory mirroring, pain is not the only shared sensation. Also the neural 
mechanisms responsive for the sensations of disgust and touch seem to be involved in 
the perception of similar states in another. The responses of somatosensory cortices are 
modulated by either observing another person touch an object (Avikainen et al., 2002), 
or observing someone being touched (Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore et al., 2005; 
Bufalari et al., 2007; Pihko et al., 2010), but the exact way of modulation seems 
complex and may vary greatly across individuals (Blakemore et al., 2005).  
 The experience of disgust seems to be partly mirrored through facial expressions 
(Phillips et al., 1997; Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003; Keysers et al., 
2004; Jabbi et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2009), but also through photos of disgust-
provoking bugs or worms placed on someone’s hand or feet (Benuzzi et al., 2008). 
 
2.4 Affective states and interoception 
The theories of emotion by William James (1884) and Carl Lange (1885/1922) 
proposed that afferent feedback from muscles and viscera provides the brain with a 
sensory ‘image’ or ‘feeling’ that characterizes the emotional state. Building on the same 
ground, Damasio (1994) advanced the somatic-marker hypothesis suggesting the 
representation of the homeostatic condition of the body to form a mechanism by which 
emotional processes guide behavior. Indeed, according to recent neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological data, emotions and other affective states are connected to one’s 
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internal feelings of the physical state of the body, i.e. interoception (Craig, 2002; 
Critchley, 2009), as well as to one’s ability to acknowledge and empathize with similar 
states in others (for reviews, see Preston & de Waal, 2002; Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Singer et al., 2009). 
 Afferent information of the physiological condition of the bodily organs is thought to 
give rise to a number of distinct bodily feelings, such as pain, itch, visceral sensations, 
hunger, thirst, taste, and touch. This interoceptive information is carried to cortical sites 
of ACC and insula along the tract of spinal dorsal column, medulla, brainstem, and 
hypothalamus (Craig, 2004). The insular cortices are activated under a variety of 
conditions involving bodily feelings, including the aforementioned pain and disgust, as 
well as thermal sensation (Craig et al., 2000), breathlessness (von Leupoldt et al., 2008; 
von Leupoldt et al., 2009), risk avoidance (Paulus et al., 2003), uncertainty (Huettel et 
al., 2006) and anticipation of both touch (Lovero et al., 2009) and unpleasant visual 
stimuli (Simmons et al., 2004). 
 Insular activity has also been connected to one’s awareness of the bodily feelings. 
Subjective awareness of the timing of one’s own heartbeat enhances insular and ACC 
activity, and furthermore, the accuracy of timing estimation, self-rated bodily 
awareness, and the individual anxiety level of subjects correlate with gray matter 
volume in right AI (Critchley et al., 2004). Additionally, individuals prone to anxiety 
show increased insula and amygdala activation while observing emotional faces (Stein 
et al., 2007), whereas anxiolytic drugs attenuate the responses (Paulus et al., 2005). 
These findings suggest that visceral responses are partly accessible to subjective 
awareness, and this connection is associated with the insular cortex. 
 
2.5 Emotional empathy, cognitive perspective-taking and 
theory of mind 
Empathy is often considered an inherently human ability to adopt someone else’s point 
of view, to understand and share another’s feelings and to appreciate their hardships — 
yet maintaining the dissociation between self and other (e.g. Batson et al., 1991; Hodges 
& Wegner, 1997; Eisenberg, 2000; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hein & Singer, 2008). 
Empathy has been proposed, among others, to provide motivation for cooperative 
behavior and communication (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006) and to function primarily 
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through emotional contagion (Preston & de Waal, 2002). The definitions to date are 
somewhat murky and variable, but empathic abilities can be divided roughly into two 
different viewpoints: affective component, the ability to share the emotional experience 
of another in an embodied manner; and a cognitive component, the ability to represent 
situational perspective of another person (Decety & Jackson, 2004). 
 The affective component (also referred to as emotional empathy), develops earlier in 
life than cognitive component due its reliance on limbic structures (for review, see 
Singer, 2006). Emotional empathy also increases under certain circumstances in humans 
and other mammals: when the observer and the target of observation are more similar 
(e.g. of the same age or gender); when the observer has previous self-experience from 
the target’s situation; when the situation of the target is more salient; when the situation 
is learned (either repeated or explicitly taught); or when the observer and the target are 
familiar with one another (for review, see Preston & de Waal, 2002). The affective 
component seems to function partly similarly in humans and other phylogenetically 
close animals (Plutchik, 1987; Brothers, 1989; Buck & Ginsburg, 1997), whereas the 
cognitive component of empathy seems closer to human capabilities of mentalizing or 
theory of mind (ToM, Vogeley et al., 2001; Siegal & Varley, 2002; Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006).  
 A widely used assessment of human empathy by Davis (1980) is divided according 
to the two different viewpoints. It contains emotional categories of feeling distress of 
others’ accidents (personal distress) and caring for others’ misfortunes (emotional 
concern), as well as cognitive categories of using imagination as a tool for 
understanding others (fantasy scale) and understanding how arguments appear from 
another’s perspective (perspective-taking). 
 Affective empathy seems to be partly connected to the responses in anterior insula. 
In human brain imaging, empathic abilities of subjects witnessing someone else’s 
painful experience are associated with the activity of AI (Singer et al., 2004), but the AI 
responses, especially in males, diminish when the person receiving painful stimuli is 
considered unfair (Singer et al., 2006). Also, the lack of empathic abilities correlates 
with reduced grey matter volume of AI in adolescents with conduct disorder (Sterzer et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, the reduced AI and amygdala activity during emotion detection 
in psychopaths suggests connection of these structures to the lack of empathy and 
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emotional representation in the condition (Birbaumer et al., 2005). However, whether 
empathic abilities of healthy adults are associated with perception of affective facial 
expressions is not well known. Study I of this thesis sampled the connection of empathy 
to brain responses during observation of facial expressions of pain. 
 Cognitive perspective-taking has been found to modulate the brain responses during 
emotional empathy: responses to another’s pain diminish when the subject knows the 
observed painful procedure has been an effective treatment rather than meaningless act 
(Lamm et al., 2007a). Furthermore, ToM tasks involving emotional rather than 
cognitive perspective-taking show stronger involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Hynes et al., 2006) — a structure associated with socio-cognitive evaluation of 
emotions — whereas tasks involving cognitive perspective-taking or mentalizing have 
been shown to activate e.g. the superior frontal gyrus, temporal poles, and the temporo-
parietal junction (Ruby & Decety, 2001; Vogeley et al., 2001; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003). The possible effect of perspective-taking abilities on expertise in social behavior 
of other species than human is not known, and it formed a part of Study IV. 
 
2.6 Expansions of social perception and cognition 
Social perception and cognition usually refer to the average human abilities of 
understanding the emotions, movements or intentions of our fellow conspecifics. 
However, some experimental work indicates that these abilities may be flexible and 
open for individual tuning rather than rigid and more or less identical across individuals. 
Thus, the neural mechanisms underpinning social understanding may expand through 
plastic changes. To clarify the possible association of this kind of changes in expertise 
in the social behavior of nonhuman species, Study IV of this thesis explored the brain 
responses of experts in dog behavior and control subjects while they observed and 
interpreted social interaction from photos of humans or dogs. 
 
2.6.1  Effects of expertise 
Experiences affect the respective neural function through cortical plasticity (Merzenich 
& Jenkins, 1993), and being an expert in some specific area represents an ultimate and 
accumulating experience on the area. Expertise has been shown to affect, for example, 
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the cortical representations of music perception (Pantev et al., 1998), motor 
performance (Schwenkreis et al., 2007), and object identification (Gauthier et al., 
2000a; Op de Beeck et al., 2006).  
 Moreover, expertise may not be limited to our own performance, but it may affect 
the way we see, comprehend, and share the experiences of others. Professional dancers 
are experts of the movements they perform, and their expertise strengthens the neural 
responses also when merely observing similar movements performed by others (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). In some cases, being an expert on some 
area may require dampening the responses on another. For example, repeated exposure 
on the affective experiences of others may diminish the brain responses usually 
associated with such a situation. When asked to estimate the intensity of pain from 
facial expressions, health care professionals underestimate the observed pain (Prkachin 
et al., 2001), and a similar effect is found in non-professionals after repeated exposure 
to pain expressions (Prkachin et al., 2004). Along the same lines, the brain areas 
consistently activated in observing others’ pain are suppressed in expert physicians, who 
instead show greater responses in areas associated with emotion regulation and 
mentalizing (Cheng et al., 2007). 
 
2.6.2  Gestural communication across species 
Social cognitive mechanisms enhance our understanding of our conspecifics, but some 
mechanisms seem to be shared also with other phylogenetically proximate species, 
providing a platform of behavior-reading or even communication across species through 
eye gaze, body movement, and vocalizations or other sounds. For example, the 
behavioral responses of cats (Blake, 1993) or chicks (Vallortigara & Regolin, 2006) to 
visual point-light walkers of their conspecifics suggest that the perception of biological 
motion also takes place in other animals: detection of biological motion might provide 
the basis of perceptual life-detection across species (Johnson, 2006). Furthermore, 
humans are able to detect the presence or absence of a living creature within a natural 
scene in half a second even with the peripheral vision (Thorpe et al., 2001), whereas 
recognition of digits or letters under similar circumstances is slower (Strasburger et al., 
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1991; Juttner & Rentschler, 2000), pointing to the specificity of processing living 
animals for our perceptual mechanisms. 
 Some experimental results propose that mechanisms underlying human social 
perception are similarly utilized in the perception of non-conspecifics. Humans 
distinguish the movement direction from point-light walkers, whether the walkers are 
humans or other animals (Troje & Westhoff, 2006). Also, the face-sensitive brain 
responses are stronger to animal faces than to nonliving objects. In intracranial 
recordings from the human temporo-occipital area, cat and dog faces evoked 200-ms 
responses that were 73% of the responses to human faces (McCarthy et al., 1999). 
Similarly, the 170-ms responses around the temporo-occipital area were 50% weaker for 
animal than human faces, but 80% weaker for nonliving objects in an MEG study 
(Halgren et al., 2000). Furthermore, animal heads (Kanwisher et al., 1999) or dog faces 
(Blonder et al., 2004) elicit stronger BOLD responses in the FFA than do inanimate 
objects. Additionally, although the cortical area EBA responds strongest to human 
bodies or body parts, it also shows preference for animals over nonliving objects 
(Downing et al., 2001). Actions performed by nonhuman animals, but included in the 
human motor repertoire, also evoke similar activations in parietal and frontal areas 
belonging to the motor mirror-neuron system (Buccino et al., 2004). Study IV of this 
thesis continued to explore the brain correlates of perceiving nonhuman animals, and 
asked whether interactional gestures of dogs are processed similarly to respective 
human gestures. 
 In addition to similar neural responses for the perception of human and nonhuman 
animals, successful across-species communication is evidenced by a vast amount of 
behavioral data. Even humans who are not expert ethologists are able to categorize the 
emotional state of an animal either by auditory (Leinonen et al., 2003; Pongracz et al., 
2005) or visual observation (Bekoff, 2007). Furthermore, not only humans comprehend 
animal behavior, but in some cases, the communication works bi-directionally. For 
example, non-human primates are able to use social cues, such as eye gaze, as a sign of 
someone’s attention (Tomasello et al., 1998; Tomasello et al., 1999; Hare et al., 2000; 
Tomasello et al., 2003; Call et al., 2004), and domestic dogs understand human gestural 
cues (Soproni et al., 2002; Miklosi et al., 2003; Gacsi et al., 2004) similarly as young 
infants (Gacsi et al., 2005; Tomasello & Kaminski, 2009). 
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3 Aims of the study 
 
This thesis investigates the correlates of social cognition and perception in the human 
brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging and magnetoencephalography along 
with behavioral methods. The specific aims of the studies were 
 
1) to explore the brain function during perception of pain from the facial expressions of 
another person, and the connection of the responses to the empathic abilities of the 
subject (Study I) 
 
2) to characterize the cortical activation sequence during observation of another’s facial 
pain expressions (Study II) 
 
3) to investigate how the contagiousness of yawning is represented and mediated in the 
human brain (Study III) 
 
4) to study the brain correlates of interpreting natural interactional gestures between 
others, and to clarify how expertise on dog behavior influences the perception of the 
interaction between two humans or two dogs (Study IV)  
 
6) to investigate the brain circuitry for processing walking sounds arising from either 
single human or multiple persons (Study V) 
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4 Materials and methods 
4.1 Participants 
The individual experiments in this thesis include data from 9–42 subjects. Altogether, 
data from 130 healthy adults are presented, analyzed and discussed; roughly half were 
male and half female, and the age range was 18–41 years. Most of the subjects had no 
prior experience in brain imaging or behavioral experiments, apart from Study III, 
where all subjects were laboratory personnel, and the behavioral parts of Studies I and 
III, where about half of the subjects were laboratory personnel. All subjects gave their 
written informed consent to the experiments, and all recordings had prior approval by 
the Ethics Committee of the Helsinki and Uusimaa district. 
 
4.2 Stimuli 
To effectively study the brain correlates of naturalistic facial expressions and bodily 
gestures, the stimuli in Studies I–IV were recorded with video and still cameras, 
processed digitally, and selected according to specific acceptance criteria. Stimuli used 
in Study V were obtained from the Sound Effects Library of the Finnish Broadcasting 
Company (Oy Yleisradio AB) specifically for this purpose. 
 For Study I, seven chronic pain patients were videotaped in the Pain Clinic of the 
Helsinki University Central Hospital, with the written permission of the patients 
themselves and a prior approval by the Ethics Committee. From the obtained material, 
the final brain imaging study included still photos from the videotapes of four patients. 
These stimuli were grayscaled, and phase-scrambled control images were generated 
from them for Study II. The yawning and control video stimuli for Study III were 
recorded originally from 20 volunteering actors of Helsinki University Medical 
Students’ Theatre Company; 10–14 second video clips from 6 actors were used in the 
final experiment, and still photos obtained from the neutral expressions in these 
videotapes were re-used as control stimuli in Studies I and II.  
 For Study IV, five dancers from Theatre Academy of Finland, and nine dogs from 
the owners in local dog club (Espoon Koirakerho) were videotaped and photographed 
both alone and together with a conspecific. Still photos of 4 humans and 4 dogs, derived 
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from both still and video cameras, were processed digitally and used in the final 
experiment. 
  Stimulus presentation was controlled by Presentation® software 
(http://www.neurobs.com/). Visual stimuli of Studies I–IV were delivered on a 
projection screen with a micromirror data projector (Christie Vista 3X and VistaProTM, 
Christie Digital Systems, Cypress, CA), and in Studies I, III and IV, viewed by the 
subject via a mirror attached to the head coil. Auditory stimuli of Study V were 
delivered through an ADU2a auditory stimulation system (Unides Design, Helsinki, 
Finland), with plastic tubes attached to ER3A earphones (Etymotic Research Inc., 
USA). 
 
4.3 Behavioral methods, questionnaires, and eye tracking 
Behavioral or psychophysical testing separate from brain imaging measurements were 
conducted in Studies I, III and V. Post-scan questionnaires sampling subjects’ 
perception or reasoning of, or attitudes towards the stimuli were collected in Studies I, 
III, IV and V, and eye tracking was conducted in Study IV simultaneously with 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
 The behavioral measures in Studies I and III were applied to validate an effective 
subset of stimuli for the planned brain imaging experiments. In Study I, 30 subjects 
estimated “the intensity of pain experienced by the person in the photo” from altogether 
125 still photos of the pain patients, resulting in a subset of 12 photos of provoked pain 
(rated highest) and 12 photos of chronic pain (rated lowest) for the usage in brain 
imaging study. In Study III, the “contagiousness” of yawns from videos of 6 actors was 
tested with 11 subjects, by quantifying the number of their overt and covert yawns from 
videotapes and electromyography (EMG) measurements of their facial muscles, while 
they observed the stimulus yawns. 
 Psychophysical testing was conducted in Study V to find a comfortable subjective 
listening level of the stimuli. The subject listened to the stimulus sounds from 
headphones and the volume was manually increased until the subject signaled detecting 
the sound; the same procedure was repeated for each stimulus type for 3–5 times, and 
the mean value of these was used as the hearing threshold. 
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 In Studies I and IV, subjects’ empathic abilities were quantified with Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980); in Study I, also Balanced Emotional Empathy 
Scale (BEES; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) was assessed. In Study IV, subjects’ 
background expertise and exposure for dog behavior was quantified with a 
questionnaire. 
 During the fMRI recordings in Study IV, the subjects’ eye movements were recorded 
with SMI MEye Track LR (long-range) eye tracking system (Sensomotoric Instruments 
GmbH, Berlin, Germany), based on video-oculography using the dark pupil – corneal 
reflection method. The infrared camera was set at the foot end of the bed to monitor 
subject’s eye via mirror that was attached to the head coil. The camera was shielded 
properly (in house) and was checked not to affect the signal-to-noise ratio of the fMRI 
data. An infrared light source was placed on the mirror box to illuminate the eye, so that 
the eye was visible to the camera. The gaze data were recorded with iViewX software at 
sampling rate of 60 Hz. The software was controlled by the trigger signals from 
stimulus presentation program, and the eye tracker was calibrated prior to fMRI 
recording with 5 calibration points, which the subject first fixated on. 
 The eye movement data were analyzed with Begaze 2.0 software (Sensomotoric 
Instruments GmbH, Berlin, Germany). The fixations of the subjects were overlaid on 
top of the example photos, and gaze maps were calculated with a smoothing kernel of 
70 pixels and a color coding for average fixation durations from 5 to 200 ms or over. 
Eye movements between experts and control subjects were compared further by 
selecting 6 sample stimuli from each dog or human category and calculating subjects’ 
fixation durations within regions of interest that were drawn manually around human 
heads and bodies and dog heads, bodies and tails. 
 
4.4 Structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
4.4.1  Overview 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is based on measuring a signal from atomic nuclei 
that contain quantum physical characteristics called nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR; 
magnetic moment caused by a moving electrical charge, and angular momentum 
resulting from an odd number of protons or neutrons). NMR is a quantum-mechanics 
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phenomenon, but can be partly visualized in the terms of classical mechanics. For 
example, the protons in hydrogen nuclei contain NMR qualities, and since hydrogen 
atoms are numerously present in water and therefore also throughout bodily tissues, 
they are commonly used as the basis for MR imaging of human tissue. The following 
brief overview is based on common textbooks (Frackowiak et al., 1997; Huettel et al., 
2004), and it considers the MR measurement with respect to hydrogen nuclei. 
 When hydrogen nuclei are placed within a high magnetic field, their protons orient to 
precess along the field either parallel (low-energy state) or antiparallel to the field (high-
energy state). In the MR measurement, energy in a form of a magnetic pulse of a certain 
radiofrequency (specific frequency depending on the imaged nucleus and the magnetic 
field strength) is applied to tilt the magnetization of a number of protons from their low-
energy states to high-energy states; this occurs when protons absorb energy from the 
radiofrequency pulse (this stage is also referred to as spin excitation). When the pulse is 
turned off, some of the excited protons return to their original parallel orientation and 
concurrently emit the energy difference from high-energy to low-energy state as a 
measurable MR signal. 
 When the radiofrequency pulse is applied, two things, which are utilized with 
specific types of MR images, happen simultaneously. Firstly, the net magnetization of 
spins is tilted as described above, and secondly, the precession of spins becomes 
momentarily coherent, i.e. they precess at the same phase. Both of these effects return to 
their original states over time, during seconds. The return of spins to their parallel 
orientation is known as longitudinal relaxation; it is measured by T1-weighted images 
and can be used for detecting different tissues and thus acquiring structurally accurate 
MR images of the brain. The return of the coherence of spin precession phases to 
incoherence is known as transverse relaxation and is affected by both the interaction of 
spins with one another and the local magnetic field inhomogenities. These two taken 
together are measured by T2*-weighted images, which are used in fMRI. 
 The most common form of fMRI is based on the different magnetic properties of 
oxygenated (diamagnetic) and deoxygenated (paramagnetic) hemoglobin in the blood, 
the latter cause local magnetic field inhomogenities that affect the transverse relaxation 
of spins. Thus, the local changes in the level of blood oxygenation can be measured, 
giving rise to the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal (Ogawa et al., 
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1990). The BOLD response depends on the oxygen consumption, cerebral blood flow, 
and the cerebral blood volume (reviewed in e.g. Logothetis, 2008). 
 Since neurons consume oxygen, their function can be inferred from the oxygen 
usage. Simultaneous recordings of fMRI and intracortical neural signals in monkeys 
(Logothetis et al., 2001; Wilke et al., 2006; Goense & Logothetis, 2008; Maier et al., 
2008) suggest that the BOLD signal reflects the local neural processing (measured by 
local field potentials) more reliably than the spiking activity of individual nerve cells. 
According to different studies, the BOLD response may include excitatory, inhibitory 
and modulatory activity, depending on the specifics of the neural resources under study 
(Logothetis, 2008). 
 
4.4.2  Measurement 
All studies included in this thesis involved structural MRI, and Studies I, III, IV and V 
also fMRI. In Studies I, IV, and V, MRI was conducted with General Electric Signa® 
3.0 T scanner at the Advanced Magnetic Imaging Centre, Aalto University School of 
Science and Technology, Finland (Figure 6), and in Study III with Siemens Sonata  
1.5 T scanner at the Research Centre Jülich, Germany. In all fMRI studies (I, III, IV, 
and V), structural MRIs were taken for better spatial visualization and group alignment 
of fMRI results. In the MEG study (II), the structural images of 8/9 subjects aided in 
calculation and visualization of the generators of the measured MEG signals by 
constraining the possible source space. Structural T1-weighted MR images were 
acquired in Studies I, II, IV, and V using a standard spoiled-gradient echo sequence, and 
in Study III using a standard MPRAGE sequence. 
 All functional MRIs were acquired using a standard head coil and gradient-echo 
planar imaging sequence with a field of view = 200 × 200 mm2 (240 × 240 mm2 in 
Study IV), time of repetition = 2000–3020 ms, time to echo = 32 ms (66 ms in Study 
III), flip angle of 75 (90 in Study III), and 31–42 axial slices with slice thickness of 3.0–
4.0 mm in interleaved acquisition order (30 slices with slice thickness of 4.0 mm and 
interslice gap of 0.4 mm in Study III). Before the stimulations, 4–6 dummy volumes 
were acquired allowing the MR signal to stabilize. 
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4.4.3  Analysis 
Functional MRI data of Studies I, IV and V were preprocessed and analyzed by 
BrainVoyager QXTM software (Brain Innovation B.V., Maastricht, Netherlands), and in 
Study III with Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM99; Wellcome Department 
of Imaging Neuroscience, London). Preprocessing of the data included iso-voxelization, 
correction for motion and slice timing, high-pass filtering (at 0.008–0.01 Hz) and 
removing linear trends of the data. 
 For analysis of the data on a group level, the volumes of each subject were spatially 
normalized to a common atlas brain; to Talairach space with BrainVoyager QXTM 
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), and to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space in 
SPM99 (Evans et al., 1993). Subsequently, the data of Studies I and III were spatially 
smoothed with Gaussian kernels of 8 and 6 mm (full width at half maximum). The data 
of Studies IV and V only included slight smoothing (resulting from iso-voxelization and 
spatial normalization) to avoid illusory spatial overlap of activations between 
nonhomologous functional areas (see White et al., 2001; Goebel et al., 2006; 
Schürmann et al., 2006). 
 Further analysis was conducted at individual level with general linear model (GLM), 
where stimulus time course was convolved as explanatory variables or “predictors” with 
the hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1995). To extend the analysis to a 
group level, the statistical significance was assessed by inserting the estimated effects of 
each condition on individual data into a random-effects analysis. Thereafter, group-level 
statistical maps were obtained by contrasting the data from the stimulus conditions of 
interest with t-tests, and the resulting maps were examined with appropriate p-values 
and thresholds for the minimum size of conjoined clusters (Forman et al., 1995). 
 In addition, Studies I and IV included region-of-interest analyses of fMRI signal 
changes in task-relevant brain areas, defined on the basis of previous literature. 
 
 
 42
 
Figure 6. Left: The 3-tesla MRI scanner at the Advanced Magnetic Imaging Centre. Right: The whole-
head MEG equipment at the Brain Research Unit, Low Temperature Laboratory. Both devices are located 
at the Aalto University of School of Science and Technology, Espoo, Finland. 
 
4.5 Magnetoencephalography 
4.5.1  Overview 
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) is a non-invasive electrophysiological method for 
studying brain function with a millisecond-scale temporal resolution. The method is 
based on measuring net magnetic fields, generated by synchronous electrochemical 
activity of thousands of cortical nerve cells, from outside the head with sensitive 
superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) sensors (see Hämäläinen et al., 
1993; Hari, 2005). MEG is most sensitive to neural currents tangential to the surface of 
the head, i.e. to those in the cortical sulci, and least sensitive to sources deep in the brain 
(Hillebrand & Barnes, 2002). However, with a specific stimulation and recording setup 
tailored for the purpose, reliable responses can be obtained even from the auditory 
brainstem (Parkkonen et al., 2009). The majority of the magnetic fields measured during 
standard experiments likely arise from the apical dendrites of the cortical pyramidal 
neurons, which are aligned in parallel and provide the temporal summation of the 
signals necessary for detecting the net field outside the scalp (Hari, 1990; Okada et al., 
1997). 
 43
 MEG is complementary to an older electrophysiological method, 
electroencephalography (EEG). EEG measures the electric potentials produced by 
neuronal activity, whereas MEG measures the magnetic fields simultaneously emerging 
from the neuronal currents. An advantage of MEG is the more accurate identification of 
the cortical current sources, since the tissues and the skull between neurons and sensors 
distort the electrical signals more than their magnetic counterparts. However, this 
downside is avoided in intracranial EEG recordings of patients. Another advantage of 
MEG is the independency of the sensors from one another in comparison to EEG 
measurements, which reflect a voltage difference between a sensor (an electrode) and its 
reference (see e.g. Hari, 2005). 
 As a completely silent and non-invasive brain research method with a high temporal 
acuity, MEG has numerous applications. Some examples from our laboratory show its 
utilization in experimental setups ranging from sensory processing or social effects in 
auditory (reviewed in Hari, 1990), visual (Portin et al., 1999), somatosensory (reviewed 
in Hari & Forss, 1999), motor (Hari et al., 1998) and pain domains (Raij et al., 2004) 
and extending to the study of brain rhythms (Salmelin & Hari, 1994; Hari & Salmelin, 
1997), language (reviewed in Salmelin et al., 2000), functional connections between 
brain areas (Kujala et al., 2008), developmental aspects in children (Parviainen et al., 
2006) and the disorders of brain function in e.g. autism (Nishitani et al., 2004), 
schizophrenia (Schürmann et al., 2007), epilepsy (Hari et al., 1993; Forss et al., 1995), 
stroke (Mäkelä & Hari, 1992) and dyslexia (Salmelin et al., 1996; Renvall & Hari, 
2003; Helenius et al., 2009). 
 
4.5.2  Measurement 
Study II of this thesis included neuromagnetic measurements, which were conducted in 
a magnetically shielded room with a whole-head Vectorview device (Figure 6; 
Neuromag, Helsinki, Finland; currently Elekta Neuromag Oy) comprising 306 sensors: 
a magnetometer and two orthogonal planar gradiometers within each of the 102 
elements. MEG signals were band-pass filtered to 0.1–170 Hz, digitized at 600 Hz, and 
averaged from 200 ms before to 1000 ms after the stimulus onset. For data analysis and 
source modeling, the responses were low-pass filtered at 40 Hz, and a prestimulus 
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baseline window of 200 ms was applied. Trials contaminated by eye movements 
(detected with horizontal and vertical electro-oculograms) or excessive MEG signals 
were discarded prior to averaging. 
 
4.5.3  Analysis 
Event-related averages within the sensor-level data were inspected from gradiometers, 
which pick up the strongest signals directly above local current sources. First, vector 
sums of the two orthogonal planar gradients were calculated for each sensor element 
and condition. Second, areal averages were calculated for six channel pairs from five 
locations that showed prominent responses, and third, areal averages were tested 
statistically for the effects of stimulus category, hemisphere and measurement session 
with repeated-measures ANOVA and post hoc comparisons. 
 The neural generators of the evoked responses were estimated with noise-normalized 
minimum-norm estimate (MNE) for 8/9 subjects whose anatomical MRI data were 
available; all channels of the MEG system were used for the analysis. The signal-to-
noise ratio was first improved with the Signal Space Separation method (Taulu et al., 
2004), and the noise covariance estimate required by the MNE was obtained from the 
baseline periods (from –200 to 0 ms relative to stimulus onset) independently for all 
subjects. The anatomical MR images were processed with the FreeSurfer software 
package (Dale et al., 1999; Fischl et al., 1999) to obtain cortical surface reconstructions; 
the border of white and gray matter was tessellated and decimated to a 7-mm grid of 
MEG source points. Thereafter, cortically constrained and noise-normalized MNEs, also 
referred to as dynamic Statistical Parametric Maps (Dale et al., 2000) were computed 
using the ‘MNE Software’ package (developed by M. Hämäläinen, 
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/martinos/userInfo/data/sofMNE.php; Lin et al., 2006). 
Finally, the individual cortical estimates were averaged at 400 ± 50 ms across subjects, 
and the results were visualized within an atlas brain. 
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5 Experiments 
 
5.1 Observation of another’s facial expression of pain recruits 
  the affective pain system in a detailed manner (Study I) 
Healthy adult humans are able to infer some features of the internal states of others from 
their gestures and behavior. For example, we immediately realize if someone in our 
vicinity is experiencing sudden acute pain, although we do not receive the noxious 
sensory input into our own pain processing system but merely the visuo-auditory input 
caused by the other human. Although the neural processing of perceiving classically 
defined emotional faces (Ekman et al., 1969) has been studied for some time, the neural 
underpinnings of other facial expressions signaling our internal states have remained 
less explored. 
 Similar to emotions, facial expression of pain contains communicative value: it may 
warn others of imminent danger and elicit helping behavior (Williams, 2002). 
Furthermore, previous fMRI studies have suggested a shared brain circuitry for 
experiencing pain and observing pain in others, similarly as has been found for facial 
expression of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003). The brain areas of anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and anterior insula (AI) are among the most commonly activated regions found 
with fMRI studies of self-experienced pain (Peyron et al., 2000), and the same areas are 
also activated when the pain is merely observed or implied in others (Singer et al., 2004; 
Botvinick et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2005).  
 In Study I, we aimed to investigate the brain responses involved in the perception of 
pain from the facial expressions of true pain patients. Furthermore, we explored the 
effect of the intensity of facial expression and the connection of brain responses to the 
empathic abilities of the subjects. 
 
5.1.1  Methods 
The stimuli included faces expressing chronic pain and provoked pain (Figure 7), and 
neutral faces as additional control stimuli (obtained from the original material for Study 
III). The pain expressions were recorded from the chronic pain patients in Helsinki 
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University Central Hospital: Chronic pain depicting pain patients during rest and 
Provoked pain presenting patients during a transient pain provocation (reproduction of 
the patients’ own pain, e.g. cautiously stretching or pressing the painful leg; patients 
themselves signaled the end of the provocation period). During the recording, patients 
estimated the intensity of the pain in both conditions. 
 After the pain face stimuli were first rated for the intensity of pain in a behavioral 
study by 30 participants, the resulting stimulus set was presented to fMRI subjects in an 
event-related fMRI study. The faces were organized pair-wise, the faces of chronic and 
provoked states of the same patient following one another in a counterbalanced manner. 
Each stimulus was displayed for 2.5 s, with an intra-pair interval of 2.5–7.5 s and 
between-pair interval of 15 s; during intervals, the subjects viewed a white fixation 
cross on a black background. Subjects were instructed to view all stimuli attentively 
during the scan to be able to answer questions concerning the stimuli after the scan. 
 Subjects reviewed the pain faces after the scan to provide estimates of pain intensity 
and distress experienced by the patient, as well as their own self-distress when viewing 
the photo, on the scale from 0 to 10. The pain intensity estimates were also included in 
the fMRI analysis as an additional regressor. In addition, the subjects completed two 
questionnaires addressing empathy (Davis, 1980; Mehrabian, 2000). 
 
5.1.2  Results 
The fMRI subjects estimated all three post-scan measures higher for faces with 
Provoked than Chronic pain (mean ± SD for pain intensity 5.4 ± 1.9 vs. 2.3 ± 1.7, P < 
0.01; for pain distress 5.5 ± 2.1 vs. 2.3 ± 1.8, P < 0.01; and for self-distress 2.8 ± 1.3 vs. 
1.1 ± 1.0, P < 0.05, Wilcoxon). The patients’ own pain ratings were consistently higher 
than the subjects’ estimates of pain intensity, for both Provoked and Chronic pain faces 
(the difference mean ± SD for Provoked pain was 2.7 ± 1.7 and for Chronic pain 1.7 ± 
2.0). 
 Provoked pain faces elicited consistently stronger brain activation than Chronic pain 
faces bilaterally in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), AI, and supplementary motor area 
(SMA), as well as in the ACC, premotor cortex, and inferior parietal lobe (IPL) of the 
left hemisphere. Furthermore, subjects’ individual estimates of pain intensity covaried 
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with the BOLD activation strengths in the left ACC, left IPL, and bilateral AI, and the 
strength of activation in the left AI–IFG region during provoked pain faces correlated 
positively with the subjects’ individual scores on the BEES scale (explained variance 
37%, P = 0.035) and the personal distress subscale of the IRI (explained variance 49%, 
P = 0.012, Spearman; Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Top left: Examples of the stimuli. Top right: Beta weights of the left AI–IFG region during 
provoked pain faces as a function of the subjects’ individual scores in personal distress scale; the line 
represents the linear best fit. Bottom: Brain areas where the BOLD response correlated with the subjects’ 
individual estimates of observed pain intensity: 1) left ACC [peak coordinates –9, 23, 43], 2) left IPL  
[–58, –58, 28], and 3) bilateral AI [–37, 12, –7 and 37, 17, –4]. The color bar indicates the t-value. 
 
5.1.3  Discussion  
In brain imaging studies of direct pain, ACC and AI are the most prominently activated 
areas (Peyron et al., 2000). They contribute to the affective components of pain 
processing (Rainville et al., 1997; Price, 2000; Rainville, 2002) and they are also 
activated to pain perceived in others (Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004; Jackson 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, their activations covary with both subjective pain intensity 
and applied physical strength of the nociceptive stimulus, and subjects’ own percept of 
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pain intensity increases proportionally to the applied pain (Coghill et al., 1999). Our 
results indicate that the observers perceive the intensity of pain also from the faces of 
another person, and ACC and AI encode this intensity. 
 These results demonstrate that activation in the subjects’ AI–IFG region during 
observation of provoked pain from the faces of true patients correlate positively with the 
empathy scales of BEES (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Mehrabian, 2000) and personal 
distress of the IRI (Davis, 1980). Similar connections to subjects’ empathic abilities 
have been found previously in situations where the subject has a close relationship with 
a person in pain (Singer et al., 2004). Here, the photos of true pain patients evoked 
strong distress in the observers (as suggested by the self-distress ratings of subjects as 
well as the correlation between AI–IFG and the IRI subscale of personal distress) 
although the patients were unknown to them, which strongly points to empathy 
involvement also in observing the pain of a complete stranger. 
 The AI was prominently activated by the facial expressions of pain in this study, but 
instead of being specific for pain perception or detection, it is possible that the region 
may represent a more general processing of unpleasant “gut” feelings due to its visceral 
input and connection to interoception. 
 
5.2 Facial expressions of pain are differentiated at the latency 
  of 300–500 ms in temporo-occipital cortex (Study II) 
Although fMRI provides an excellent spatial resolution for studying the human brain, its 
temporal resolution is poorer than the one obtained with electrophysiological 
measurements. In Study II, we aimed to complement the fMRI results by inspecting the 
brain responses to facial expressions of pain from another perspective. More 
specifically, we aimed to characterize the temporally accurate cortical activation 
sequence of neuromagnetic brain responses during observing another’s facial pain 
expressions. 
 
5.2.1  Methods 
The stimuli from Study I were re-used here with minor modifications: the photos 
depicting Provoked pain, Chronic pain and Neutral facial expressions were grayscaled 
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and also scrambled (phase-randomized) for creating a fourth category, Scrambled faces. 
Stimuli were presented in two subsequent recording sessions, and each stimulus was 
shown for 2 s, with and inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of 2.0–2.5 s. Subjects were 
instructed to view all stimuli attentively. 
 Neuromagnetic signals were band-pass filtered to 0.1–170 Hz and digitized at  
600 Hz. The responses were averaged from 200 ms before the stimulus to 1000 ms after 
the stimulus onset. For data analysis and source modeling, the responses were low-pass 
filtered at 40 Hz, and a pre-stimulus baseline window of 200 ms was applied. Before 
averaging, trials contaminated with eye movements (detected from horizontal and 
vertical electro-oculograms) or excessive MEG signals were discarded. In both 
recording sessions, ≥ 39 responses for each stimulus category were acquired. 
 For this study, the behavioral data of Study I were re-analyzed to examine whether 
the subjects’ pain intensity ratings were affected by repeated exposure to the pain 
expressions of the same patient.  
 
5.2.2  Results 
Repeated-measures ANOVA of the pain ratings from the behavioral part of Study I 
revealed the main effects of both pain intensity and stimulus repetition on the pain 
ratings (repetition × intensity; p < 0.001 for intensity and p < 0.05 for repetition). The 
planned contrasts showed 9% decrease of the pain ratings for Provoked pain faces from 
the first to the last photo of a patient (from 7.14 ± 0.16 for the first photo to 6.48 ± 0.17 
for the last photo; p < 0.01, paired-samples t-test), whereas the ratings of Chronic pain 
faces did not change (3.36 ± 0.15 for the first photo vs. 3.10 ± 0.15 for the last photo). 
 Characteristic visual responses peaked in occipital sensors around 100 ms to all 
stimuli, and face-sensitive responses peaked around 140 ms in bilateral temporo-
occipital sensors for Provoked, Chronic, and Neutral faces (Figure 8). A much slower 
deflection for intact face stimuli peaked around 300–500 ms in the temporal-lobe 
sensors bilaterally, although with right-hemisphere dominance. For these responses, 
main effects were found for stimulus, session and hemisphere (repeated-measures 
ANOVA of stimulus × session × hemisphere; p < 0.0001, p < 0.001, and p < 0.005, 
respectively).  
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 With minimum norm source modeling, the brain responses within 350–450 ms were 
localized around the middle STS (Figure 8). At sensor level, the responses were 30 ± 
7% stronger for Provoked than Chronic pain faces in the right hemisphere, whereas the 
responses for Chronic pain vs. Neutral faces did not differ (p < 0.005 and p = 0.4, 
respectively; planned comparisons with paired-samples t-test). The responses to 
Provoked pain faces were about 40% stronger in the right than the left hemisphere in the 
first measurement session, and these responses decreased by 24 ± 4% in the second 
session compared with the first (p < 0.001; paired-samples t-test); no similar 
modulations were found for Chronic or Neutral faces. 
 
 
Figure 8. Middle: Magnified sample responses of a typical subject, shown as vector sums calculated from 
two orthogonal gradiometers, at six regions of the MEG channel layout as seen from above. The traces 
are from –200 ms to 1000 ms and the latencies of the peak amplitudes are marked; the amplitudes are 
given as fT/cm. Left and right: Across-subject average source models within the 350–450 ms time 
window, obtained by the cortically-constrained minimum norm estimates and shown on the atlas brain 
with opened sulci. 
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5.2.3  Discussion  
The results demonstrated that the middle STS responds more strongly to facial 
expressions of Provoked than Chronic pain at 300–500 ms, with right-hemisphere 
dominance. The responses to Provoked pain expressions decreased from the first to the 
second session by a quarter, whereas no dampening was observed for Chronic pain 
faces; similarly, the behavioral ratings of the Provoked faces decreased after repeated 
exposure but ratings of Chronic faces remained the same. 
 Certain neuronal populations in STS respond specifically to faces and facial 
expressions both in monkeys (Perrett et al., 1982; Hasselmo et al., 1989a) and humans 
(Ojemann et al., 1992; Puce et al., 1999). Although the expressions of pain are not 
included amongst the universal facial expressions of emotions (Ekman et al., 1969), our 
results resemble previous findings on emotion expressions in latency (Krolak-Salmon et 
al., 2001; Ashley et al., 2004; Morel et al., 2009) and location (Winston et al., 2004; 
Engell & Haxby, 2007). Intensive facial expressions of fear, similarly to our Provoked 
pain, affect the brain responses over occipito-temporal EEG electrodes at 190–290 ms 
(Leppänen et al., 2007). Moreover, the middle STS responses for Provoked pain faces in 
our study were strongly right-hemisphere dominant, suggesting further similarities with 
emotion processing. Right hemisphere has been associated with negative emotional 
facial expressions, such as fear (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2001), and it has been suggested 
to have an important role in all urgent and threatening situations (Davidson, 1992; Van 
Strien & Morpurgo, 1992; Adolphs et al., 1996). 
 The decrease of the brain responses for Provoked pain expressions from the first to 
the second measurement session agrees with a similar decrease of the 300-ms MEG 
responses to fearful faces (Morel et al., 2009). Both this finding and our results show 
decreased responses to negative expressions, but no similar decrease to happy or neutral 
faces (Morel et al., 2009) or to chronic pain faces (this study). Together, these results 
may reflect an ecologically valid mechanism to save the observer’s resources by 
diminishing the prolonged affective load — similarly as is proposed for health care 
professionals, who attribute less pain to facial expressions than nonprofessionals 
(Kappesser & Williams, 2002). 
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5.3 Contagiousness of yawning is mediated by brain areas 
  associated with biological motion and emotion (Study III) 
The contagiousness of yawning is a well known phenomenon: when we see another 
person yawn, we may be triggered to do the same. The underlying mechanism of the 
contagion, however, is not well understood. Low oxygen or high carbon dioxide levels 
in the shared physical environment of the yawners does not explain the contagiousness 
(Provine et al., 1987; Baenninger, 1997), whereas social functions of yawns as cues 
synchronizing group behavior seem more likely (Deputte, 1994; Daquin et al., 2001). 
 In Study III, we aimed to pinpoint how the perception of a yawning face is processed 
in the human brain, and furthermore, to investigate the neural correlates of yawn 
contagiousness when healthy adults observe other people yawn and feel the tendency to 
yawn themselves. 
 
5.3.1  Methods 
The stimuli were videos of 6 actors either yawning or producing a non-nameable tongue 
movement maneuver, which resembled the motor movement pattern during yawns 
without mimicking mild yawns (Figure 9). Prior to the fMRI experiments, the 
contagiousness of the yawns within the stimuli was confirmed in a psychophysical 
study on 11 subjects, none of whom participated in the fMRI part. In the pre-study, the 
subjects’ facial movements during the Yawn and Control videos were videotaped and 
recorded with EMG electrodes attached to the facial muscles, to obtain an estimate of 
the subjects’ overt or covert yawning frequency during both stimulus types. 
 In the fMRI experiment, blocks of Yawn and Control videos were presented in 
pseudo-randomized order, counterbalanced across subjects. The mean duration of 
blocks was 25 s in both conditions, and a blank screen was shown for 18–21 s between 
the blocks. The subjects were informed that the aim of the study was to investigate the 
perception of human faces, they were instructed to view the stimuli with full attention, 
and their overt yawning was prevented by constraining the subjects’ head and chin 
using Stifneck collars (Laerdal Medical Corporation, Wappingers Falls, NY, USA).  
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 In a post-scan questionnaire, the subjects estimated how strongly they were tempted 
to yawn during the Yawn and Control videos. For each subject, the difference between 
the mean estimate of Yawn videos and mean of Control videos served as a measure of 
yawn susceptibility rate during the scan session. 
 
 
Figure 9. Top: Examples of the stimulus videos. Bottom left: Yawn stimuli contrasted with Control 
stimuli activated the right STS (56, –42, 6 and 54, –6, –20), and left STS (–56,–4, –16). Bottom right: 
Activation in the left periamygdalar region (–30, 0, –34) covaried negatively with the subjects’ self-
ratings of yawn susceptibility (p < 0.009, corrected). Color bars present the Z scores. 
 
5.3.2  Results 
Analysis of the pre-study video and EMG recordings of subjects’ facial movements 
from the skin surface during the Yawn and Control videos showed more frequent overt 
or covert yawns during Yawn videos than during the Control videos (25 vs. 10 yawns; P 
= 0.016, Wilcoxon). Similarly in the fMRI study participants, Yawn videos evoked a 
stronger tendency to yawn than did Control videos (2.8 ± 0.2 vs. 1.4 ± 0.1 (mean ± 
SEM), respectively; P < 0.001, Wilcoxon).  
 Yawn videos provoked significantly stronger activation than Control videos in the 
posterior part of the right STS and in the anterior parts of STS bilaterally (Figure 9). 
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Furthermore, the subjects’ yawn susceptibility showed a negative covariance with the 
signal from the left periamygdalar region during the contrast of Yawn vs. Control, 
whereas no regions with negative covariance were found in the corresponding analysis 
for Control vs. Yawn videos. 
 
5.3.3  Discussion 
The results quantify the tendency in two cultural samples — Finnish in the pre-test part 
and German in the fMRI part — to feel the urgency to yawn more frequently after 
seeing someone else yawn. The lack of motor mirroring in the inferior frontal cortex 
specific for the yawn observation suggested yawning to be a lower-level motor pattern, 
triggered rather automatically. Furthermore, the results show that the activation within 
the STS — particularly in the right hemisphere — differentiates perception of yawning 
from physically similar non-yawn gestures. The activation of the posterior part of STS 
agrees with the role of the STS in processing social cues of biological motion (Puce & 
Perrett, 2003) and orofacial gestures (Nishitani & Hari, 2002), as well as in the 
detection of the outcomes of an agent’s behavior (Frith & Frith, 1999; Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003). In addition, the activation of the anterior part of STS was close to the site 
with specificity for facial movements over static faces (Puce & Allison, 1999). 
 Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the yawn susceptibility covaries negatively 
with amygdala activity (i.e. contagiousness increases as amygdalar activation 
decreases). Yawns are also more contagious for individuals with less schizotypal 
personality traits (have e.g. more trust towards others; Platek et al., 2003), and amygdala 
activation decreases when implicit trustworthiness of observed faces increases (Winston 
et al., 2002); these findings, together with our results, imply a possible relationship 
between yawn contagiousness and the trust/suspicion rising from the implicit analysis of 
human faces (Critchley et al., 2000; Phelps et al., 2000). This kind of interaction cannot 
be verified with the current data set but seems a relevant topic for future research on 
yawning. 
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5.4 Expertise on the behavior of another species is reflected 
  in object- and body-sensitive visual areas (Study IV) 
The ability of humans to infer nonverbal social cues from others depends on the 
perceptual systems, motor and affective mirroring mechanisms, and cognitive 
evaluation. However, we are not strictly limited to understanding our fellow humans, 
but we are also able to interpret the gestural communication of other species, especially 
social mammals such as domestic dogs. Even persons who have never owned a dog are 
able to recognize a dog’s emotional state (Pongracz et al., 2005), and vice versa, 
domestic dogs are able to use the social gestures of humans as an aid for searching a 
target location (Gacsi et al., 2005), similarly to human infants (Tomasello & Kaminski, 
2009). 
To date, little is known about the underlying mechanisms of the ability to read social 
gestures of another species. In Study IV, we aimed to investigate the neural 
underpinnings of such across-species expertise, and clarify whether expertise in social 
interaction of another species affects the response profile of brain areas that usually 
process the interactive gestures of humans. 
 
5.4.1  Methods 
Two different subject groups participated in the study: dog experts with strong 
experience of dog behavior, and control subjects with no such experience. The stimuli 
included photos of two humans facing each other and greeting by e.g. shaking hands or 
hugging (Human_inter), two humans in the same photo but facing away and not 
interacting (Human_away), two dogs facing each other and greeting by sniffing and 
playing (Dog_inter), two dogs in the same photo but facing away, not interacting 
(Dog_away), and crystallized pixel figures used as control stimuli (Pixel; examples of 
the human and dog stimuli are shown in Figure 10). 
 Each stimulus was shown for 2.5 s in a continuous 25-s stimulus block, which 
alternated with 25-s rest blocks where the subject only saw the fixation cross on a 
moderately grey background. The subjects were informed that they would see images of 
people, dogs, and pixel compositions. They were instructed to explore the images freely 
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without moving their head, and inspect the attitude of the beings towards one another or 
towards their surroundings, whenever possible.  
 After the fMRI, the subjects filled in a background questionnaire concerning their 
expertise of dog behavior, and an empathy questionnaire (IRI by Davis, 1980). 
 
5.4.2  Results 
The numbers and durations of fixations within the areas of interests around human 
heads and bodies, and dog heads, bodies and tails did not differ between control subjects 
and experts, neither did the IRI scores. Instead, the background questionnaire quantified 
the group differences in expertise of dog behavior, attitudes towards dogs and the 
exposure for the presence of dogs: all measures showed less exposure for dog behavior 
in control than expert group. 
 The overall brain activations were very similar in both groups: the main effects of 
observing humans or dogs elicited bilateral activation within the brain circuitry 
associated with “visuomotor perception of emotional body language” (de Gelder, 2006), 
including e.g. the fusiform gyrus, amygdala, intraparietal sulcus (IPS), premotor cortex, 
and pSTS. 
 Both groups showed stronger brain activation in Human_inter > Human_away 
contrast in the amygdala and pSTS. Both groups had also stronger amygdala activation 
in Human_inter > Dog_inter, where non-experts had also stronger pSTS activation. 
Furthermore, Dog_inter > Dog_away contrast showed stronger activation of the left 
pSTS in dog experts only. 
 The ROI analyses of the pSTS–LO area, important for object (Grill-Spector, 2003) 
and body perception (Peelen & Downing, 2007), revealed stronger activations in both 
groups to Human_inter than Human_away in bilateral pSTS (Figure 10, top right). The 
pSTS–LO activations were stronger to Dog_inter than Dog_away in dog experts but not 
in non-experts (repeated-measures ANOVAs and planned contrasts). Furthermore, the 
experts’ responses were stronger than those of controls for Dog_inter throughout pSTS–
LO in the right hemisphere. 
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5.4.3  Discussion  
The study explored how observing social interaction between others is reflected in the 
brain activity, and how expertise in the behavior of another species modulates this 
activity. Brain activations were remarkably similar when subjects observed people or 
dogs in corresponding interactional situations: brain regions involved in the processing 
of social perception were activated both in experts and control subjects. These results 
support the view that the same or overlapping brain regions process all interaction 
appearing intentional, as is previously shown for moving geometrical shapes (Castelli et 
al., 2000). Moreover, these findings suggest that the brain areas processing gestures of 
single humans also process the social interaction of two agents, whether human or dog. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Left: Examples of the stimuli Human_inter, Human_away (top), Dog_inter and Dog_away 
(bottom). Top right: Three ROI locations along the z axis (4, –1 and –6) in the left and right hemispheres. 
Bottom right: Differences of the percentage signal changes between Human_inter and Human_away 
conditions in the three ROIs within left and right hemispheres, and the corresponding signals for 
Dog_inter and Dog_away conditions. White = experts, grey = controls. 
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 The main goal of the study was to investigate how expertise in dog behavior 
influences the brain activity during interpretation of communicational bodily signals of 
dogs. The pSTS was activated more strongly for interacting than non-interacting 
humans in both experts and controls. Importantly, the dog experts’ pSTS–LO 
activations were also stronger for interacting than non-interacting dogs, whereas control 
subjects showed no such difference. These results imply that expertise affects the brain 
responses for social gestures of other species. The findings also suggest that during the 
experience of the behavior of dogs, brain responses for dogs’ social gestures are 
enhanced in the part of the temporo-occipital cortex that includes representations of 
objects, bodies, and motion (Peelen et al., 2006; Downing et al., 2007). 
 The cortical area that in dog experts showed sensitivity for the interactional gestures 
of dogs was in the midst of the temporo-occipital areas pSTS, EBA, MT+/V5, and 
LOC, thus supporting the finding that expertise in object identification alters the 
objects’ representation in the right lateral occipital gyrus (Op de Beeck et al., 2006). 
Enhanced activation of experts to interacting dogs in this region might be interpreted as 
specialized processing of either the body form, implied biological motion, or “object” 
(dog) perception. First, since the EBA is partially activated for animal bodies, although 
less than for human bodies (Downing et al., 2001), the experts’ enhanced responses to 
dogs’ interaction gestures around this region may represent extension of the EBA for 
dog bodies in experts. Second, since implied body motion is processed also in the 
MT+/V5 complex (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Senior et al., 2000), the observed 
activation may represent an engagement of this area in dog experts by the implied 
motion in dog photos. Third, since the object-sensitive cortex is thought to be associated 
with detecting shapes rather than contours of objects (Grill-Spector, 2003), the dog 
experts’ enhanced activation may represent a part of the object-sensitive cortex 
specialized for dog body postures, if postures are considered as “shapes”. 
 To summarize, our results show that similar basic processing of social interaction 
takes place across individuals in brain areas associated with the processing of gestures 
from single persons. Furthermore, the findings suggest that experts in the behavior of 
other species (here, dogs) develop sensitivity for interactional body gestures of the 
species in the temporo-occipital area related to perception of biological motion, bodies, 
and objects. 
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5.5 Sounds of humans walking alone or together activate the 
  social brain areas with an increasing complexity (Study V) 
Human footsteps carry a rich pattern of social information: it is often possible to infer 
the mood or gender of the walking person by only listening to the footsteps on a 
hallway. We may similarly be able to distinguish the number of walkers, whether 
people are walking together, and if one is escaping from or leading another. In Study V, 
we aimed to investigate the brain responses to sounds of either one person walking 
alone or two people (a small group) walking together. 
 
5.5.1  Methods 
The stimuli comprised sounds of human footsteps on asphalt and rhythmical bursts of 
white noise. The human walking sounds were either from one human male walking 
(Step1) or from two people walking (a female with high heels and a man; Step2), and 
the corresponding control stimuli were rhythmical bursts of white noise of constant 
amplitude (Noise1) or bursts of white noise with two different amplitudes (Noise2). 
Control sounds were matched to the walking sounds in duration, rhythm, and amplitude 
variation. The footstep sounds and the noise bursts were also matched in their intensity 
variation and in the total root mean square (RMS) power. 
 The sounds were presented binaurally in a pseudorandom order in blocks of 30 s for 
each (with the mean ± SD intensities across stimuli 54 ± 4 dB HL); every fifth block 
was rest without any stimuli. Subjects were asked to listen carefully to the sounds and to 
pay equal attention to all of them in order to be able to answer a questionnaire on the 
sounds after the scan. The presence of qualitative post-scan questionnaire, which 
concerned some stimulus qualities, was aimed to enhance the subjects’ attention and 
cognitive evaluation of the stimulus sounds. 
 
5.5.2  Results 
The footstep sounds (Step1 and Step2 combined) and noise sounds (Noise1 and Noise2 
combined) revealed activations bilaterally in cortical and thalamic auditory areas. 
Additionally, footstep sounds (Step1 + Step2) activated bilateral pSTS region whereas 
noise sounds (Noise1 + Noise2) did not. 
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 In the comparison of Step1 > Noise1, main activations were in the left pSTS and left 
amygdala, whereas the comparison of Step2 > Noise2 produced much more scattered 
activations e.g. in the right temporal pole, the bilateral subcallosal gyrus (Figure 11), 
and the right amygdala. In both contrasts, activation was stronger for noise than footstep 
sounds bilaterally in the auditory cortices. 
 
 
Figure 11. Clusters of activation depict the differences between stimulus conditions marked with asterisk 
(*) in the histograms below, where the percentage signal changes within the region are shown for all 
stimulus conditions. Left: Listening to the sounds of a person walking alone (Step1) contrasted with noise 
sounds (Noise1) activated left pSTS. Right: The sounds of two people walking together (Step2) contrasted 
with control noise sounds (Noise2) activated nodes within the right temporal pole and subcallosal gyrus. 
Blue = Step1, light blue = Noise1, red = Step2, pink = Noise2; the color bar presents the T values. 
 
5.5.3  Discussion  
The results show that listening to footstep sounds of another person activates the pSTS, 
and the activation is lateralized to left hemisphere during the listening of footstep 
sounds of a single person (Step1 > Noise1). The observed pSTS activation agrees with 
the prior data on association of the “biological motion area” (Puce & Perrett, 2003) with 
auditory walking (Bidet-Caulet et al., 2005).  
 Hearing other humans’ mouth or hand actions may activate the motor mirror-neuron 
system (Gazzola et al., 2006), whereas the sounds of footsteps have failed to activate the 
premotor or IFG region (Bidet-Caulet et al., 2005), in line with our results. The lack of 
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IFG activation by footstep sounds could reflect the strong preference of the MNS to 
hand and mouth actions: in monkeys, the motor areas forming the core of the MNS 
(areas F5 and IPS) have representations mainly for hand and mouth (Luppino & 
Rizzolatti, 2000). 
 Although single footstep sounds activated mainly the pSTS area, the contrast Step2 > 
Noise2 revealed activation of a more scattered network, comprising the right temporal 
pole, amygdala, and perigenual gyrus in the subcallosal cingulate area. Of these areas, 
temporal poles are considered to belong to the theory-of-mind circuitry (Siegal & 
Varley, 2002; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). Temporal poles are widely connected with 
other areas processing socio-emotional stimuli, such as amygdala, superior temporal 
gyrus, occipitobasal cortex, orbital gyrus and insula (Chabardes et al., 2002), and thus 
thought to integrate high-level perception with emotional responses (Olson et al., 2007). 
Additionally, amygdala is involved in recognition of emotion from body postures (de 
Gelder et al., 2004) and regulation of the personal space between individuals (Kennedy 
et al., 2009), and its activation here might reflect monitoring the emotional content of 
the auditory scene or the distance between two walkers. Also the perigenual gyrus is 
involved in emotional affect by taking part in self-generated sadness and happiness 
(Damasio et al., 2000), and its activity correlates with the increasing pleasantness of the 
listened music (Blood et al., 1999), suggesting connection between processing 
emotional auditory content and perigenual activity. 
 Social and emotional processing are intermingled in a complex manner during any 
normal social interaction, and the temporal poles are associated with both kind of 
processing (for a review, see Olson et al., 2007). According to our subjects’ comments 
after the scan, the mere presence of two people in the same auditory scene provoked 
more mentalizing of their intentions (e.g. whether one is following another) than 
listening to the walking sounds of only one person. Thus, the activations of both 
temporal poles and emotion-related brain regions in the Step2 condition might have 
been related to mentalizing of the intentions of the walkers. 
 Altogether, the present imaging results suggest that the analysis of auditory social 
scenes involving more than one agent recruits a right-hemisphere dominant social brain 
circuitry, with core nodes in the subcallosal area, the right temporal pole, and the left 
pSTS. The subcallosal area and the right temporal pole responded to the auditory scenes 
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involving two walkers instead of only one, whereas the left pSTS seemed to prefer 
simpler and more coherent single footsteps. Thus, this circuitry seems to treat 
differently single and double footsteps, implying separate processing for these two types 
of stimuli. 
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6 General discussion 
 
This thesis explored spatial and temporal brain correlates of social perception and 
cognition in study setups involving perception of meaningful facial gestures and body 
postures (or movement) in social settings. 
 We discovered support to findings that pain perceived from another person engages 
the brain structures of ACC and AI that are also involved in the perception of self-
experienced pain, and that the insular responses during pain observation correlate with 
the empathic abilities of the subject. In addition, we demonstrated that observation of 
pain expressions even from the faces of complete strangers recruits the affective pain 
system in a detailed manner: the activation of ACC and AI covaried with the pain 
intensity estimated from the facial expressions (Study I). We proceeded to address the 
temporal cortical activation sequence associated with facial pain expressions, and found 
that the responses for strong and mild pain expressions differ at 300–500 ms from the 
stimulus onset in the middle STS: the latencies and the cortical site are similar to those 
previously found for faces with classically defined basic emotional expressions (Study 
II). Furthermore, we established that dynamical yawning faces evoke middle and 
posterior STS activity, and that the social contagiousness of yawning correlates 
negatively with amygdalar activity (Study III). 
 Our results further showed that social interaction observed between two members of 
the same species, whether human or canine, both engage the brain areas commonly 
associated with social cognition. We continued further to address the effect of expertise 
on gestural communication of another species: dog experts showed differentiation of 
interaction from non-interaction for both human and dog stimuli in the body- and 
object-sensitive pSTS-LO area, whereas control subjects showed similar results for 
human stimuli only (Study IV). Finally, we demonstrated the engagement of pSTS 
during single human walking sounds, yet more scattered pattern of activation with 
walking sounds of multiple persons, suggesting increasing complexity in brain 
responses respective to more complicated social settings (Study V). 
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6.1 Perception of facial and bodily gestures 
The perception of facial and bodily gestures was strongly associated with STS function 
in all studies of this thesis apart from Study I, in which we took extra care to obtain 
merely the brain activations related to pain expressions, not activations related to face 
perception as such or to variations in neutral expressions. Across studies, the STS 
region was consistently activated during perception of biological movement of faces 
(Study III; anterior and pSTS) and bodies (Study V; pSTS), as well as during perception 
of still images of faces (Study II; middle STS) or bodies (Study IV; pSTS) that 
contained merely implied movement with contracted muscles. 
 Indeed, brain regions around the superior temporal sulcus are associated with 
extraction of changeable features from faces relevant for social communication, such as 
gaze, movement, and facial expressions (Figure 12 and Allison et al., 2000; Haxby et 
al., 2000; Haxby et al., 2002). In monkeys, the STS region has been studied extensively 
for several decades, revealing neuronal populations specifically responsive for eye gaze 
(Perrett et al., 1985b), head orientation (Perrett et al., 1985b; Perrett et al., 1991), facial 
expression or identity (Hasselmo et al., 1989a; Perrett & Mistlin, 1990), head movement 
(Hasselmo et al., 1989b), body movement (Perrett et al., 1985a) or biological motion in 
general (Perrett et al., 1985a; Perrett et al., 1990; Oram & Perrett, 1994; Oram & 
Perrett, 1996). Furthermore, the neurons within STS have multisensory properties 
(Barraclough et al., 2005). In humans, the STS reacts similarly to many kind of social 
cues (reviewed in e.g. Allison et al., 2000; Haxby et al., 2000; Puce & Perrett, 2003).  
 The monkey single-cell recordings and human brain imaging studies suggest that the 
STS regions in humans and monkeys are similarly engaged during perception of facial 
features. If specific neural populations encode facial features also in the human brain, as 
suggested by intracranial studies (McCarthy et al., 1999; Puce et al., 1999), it is 
plausible that different combinations of static or dynamic facial and bodily gestures, 
transmitting one’s emotional states and attitudes, activate the STS region with a specific 
pattern, as was found in our Studies II–V.  
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Figure 12. Meta-analysis of activation foci from a number of studies involving perception of dynamic or 
stationary hands, mouths, eye gaze, or bodies. Adapted from Allison et al. (2000) with permission from 
Elsevier. 
 
 Moreover, studies on the theory of mind have suggested that the part of pSTS in 
humans, closer to temporo-parietal junction, is involved in extracting intentions or 
intentional activity from the stimuli in a more general context — for example, from 
cartoons or geometrical shapes, not merely from other humans (Castelli et al., 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). The results of our Study IV support 
this notion, showing similar activation of the STS close to temporo-parietal junction for 
stimuli with social interaction of two intentional creatures, whether they are humans or 
dogs. Interestingly, the cells in the monkey STS possess some plasticity, e.g. by 
changing their firing pattern after learning (Rolls et al., 1989). Similar capability for 
experience-derived plasticity of social perception in the human brain would partly 
explain our findings of expertise effects on the function of pSTS (Study IV), even 
though the cause and effect of becoming an expert in the behavior of another species 
remains to be studied. 
 
6.2 Similarities of shared sensations 
The neural mechanisms underlying sharing one’s internal affective-emotional states 
with others was assessed in Studies I and III, although the concept can be broadly 
associated also with the other studies of this thesis. Transmission of another’s strong 
internal state, pain, from a person’s facial expressions was associated with activation of 
brain areas previously associated with self-experience of pain (Study I). On the other 
hand, a dynamical facial expression of a yawn was not associated with motor mirroring 
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of the movement, suggesting yawning to be a lower-level motor pattern triggered rather 
automatically (Study III). Additionally, the degree of subjects’ urgency to yawn 
correlated negatively with amygdala activation, signaling the important role of trust and 
vigilance with a sensory state necessary for yawn contagiousness. 
 In general, shared sensations seem to include merely proximate, embodied senses: 
somatosensory (touch and pain), olfactory (disgust) or taste (disgust), whereas an idea 
of mirrored distal senses — vision or audition — seems absurd and unnecessary. We 
have no need for replaying another’s experiences if we can gain the same information 
ourselves by just following another’s attention; instead, we cannot get any information 
from the proximate senses of another person unless we are able to catch even a faint 
echo of what the other one is experiencing. The socially transmitted, immediate and 
internalized understanding of another’s experience means an advantage for our own (as 
well as the peer’s) survival, as it may bring us an effective warning (and helping) signal. 
 Of the mirrored sensations, pain and disgust are both results of something harmful 
and potentially dangerous happening within our body, likely containing relevant 
information also for our conspecifics: “Don’t make the same mistake I’m making, this is 
no good”. The social transmission of both pain and disgust seem to rely on ACC and AI 
that are associated with monitoring our own internal bodily states (Craig, 2002). 
Interestingly, the perception of another’s pain seems to function similarly also in 
persons with congenital insensitivity for pain (Danziger et al., 2009), suggesting that it 
is not the nociceptive receptors as such, but the capability for representing the 
unpleasantness associated with pain that is necessary for pain mirroring. 
 The sensation of touch differs from mirroring pain and disgust: it presents a more 
intimate sense, revealing structures and textures of the environment or social 
relationships of others. Another’s experience of touch may not convey the possibility of 
similar danger to observers like pain and disgust, but internalizing the nature of touch 
may be otherwise important within a human social community. Knowing whether a 
touch is violent or gentle helps to keep track of the relationships within the community 
and adjust one’s behavior accordingly. In the persons with vision–touch synaesthesia, 
however, the matching mechanism may become overactive and limit the normal 
functioning of an individual (Blakemore et al., 2005). 
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6.3 Perceiving individuals or groups 
Human groups are known to affect our behavior: acting within a group may aid in 
finding a creative solution to a problem (Hong & Page, 2004), but often one is also 
reminded of “ryhmässä tyhmyys tiivistyy” (a Finnish proverb, "Stupidity condenses 
within a group"), which points to the apparently diminished decision-making 
capabilities of an individual committed to a group: the effects of a mass panic or the 
functioning of e.g. football hooligans seem to rely strongly on such group cohesion. The 
effect of perceiving humans as individuals or as a small group of two was addressed in 
this thesis (Study V), in the simplified experimental setup where subjects listened to 
walking sounds of a man, or footstep sounds of a man and a woman walking together. 
Our results showed stronger activation of biological motion -sensitive pSTS during 
single human walking sounds respective to matched control (noise) sounds. Instead, 
more complex pattern of activation was associated with walking sounds of two people, 
including brain areas related to the theory of mind and emotional control. These results 
suggest that even in a very simple experimental setting, the number of humans 
perceived does not merely increase the responses engaged to perception of individual 
humans but increases the complexity in brain responses related to social environment. 
 Similar results were suggested by the unpublished data originally gathered for Study 
IV: observing two persons within the same stimuli, compared with stimuli including 
only one person, illustrated a widespread activation network that was even stronger 
when the two people were interacting than not interacting. Thus, the brain responses for 
one person are not merely multiplied when more people are observed at the same time, 
but the brain response patterns also get more complex. The study by Iacoboni and 
colleagues (2004) also reported enhanced brain activations while the subjects observed 
dynamic social interaction of two people compared with observing one person alone. 
From their choice of stimuli, they state:  
 
 “we opted not to show segments in which two actors are not interacting as a 
 control condition ---. It seemed to us likely that viewers would anticipate or infer 
 a relationship among people presented simultaneously on a split screen, even 
 though these people were not directly interacting.” (Iacoboni et al., 2004) 
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 Despite the possibility of relationships inferred or imagined by the subjects as 
denoted previously, the results of Study IV established that a difference in brain 
activations for interacting and non-interacting conditions can be obtained, albeit the 
difference might be weaker than that obtained between perceiving single or multiple 
persons. However, the studies on perception of individuals or groups are still rare, and 
the topic is likely to become more extensively studied in the future. 
 
6.4 Individual differences in behavior and brain responses 
Humans share species-specific, general perceptual and cognitive mechanisms needed 
for social interaction, and the underlying processing can be partly localized in the 
human brain. However, everyone has a slightly different viewpoint on the world, thus 
one’s individual social cognition likely contains unique features depending on the slight 
individual variation and “tuning” of the common mechanisms due to one’s former 
interactions and life history. 
 In brain imaging, individual differences in responses often have to be ignored in the 
search for group-level effects, although the differences may contain important 
additional information. Understanding the connection of individual differences in brain 
responses with the behavior and experiences of the individuals would certainly shed 
light on the amount of plasticity within certain brain areas. In Studies I, III and IV of 
this thesis, subjects’ differences in their self-reported percepts (Studies I and III) or past 
experiences (Study IV) were connected with the differences in brain activation. Similar 
behavioral information might have also benefited the analyses of Studies II and V. 
 Behavioral training is known to induce plastic changes in auditory, object-sensitive 
and motor cortices (e.g. Pantev et al., 1998; Gauthier et al., 2000a; Calvo-Merino et al., 
2005; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Op de Beeck et al., 2006; Schwenkreis et al., 2007). In 
Study IV, we associated expertise in gestures of dogs to functional differences within 
body- and object-sensitive cortices. The results suggest that brain areas responsive to 
social information are modulated through experience, and understanding behavior of 
another species might rely on plastic changes in brain function. 
 Despite plasticity, part of the individual variation in social cognition and the 
associated brain processes may also depend on possible genetic differences across 
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individuals. As an example from a purely perceptual domain, a certain odor of 
androstenone (derived from testosterone) can be subjectively perceived as offensive, 
pleasant or neutral, depending on the genotypic variation in the odorant receptor (Keller 
et al., 2007). Similar links of subjective experiences to genetic differences might also 
explain part of the variation in brain responses underlying social perception and 
cognition. To which extent adult brains contain individual plasticity in processing social 
information remains to be explored, as do the genetic bases of social functions 
(Blakemore et al., 2004), and the effects of long-term training in e.g. professions 
strengthening or diminishing the reactivity for social information. 
 
6.5 Methodological considerations 
6.5.1  Complementary data on brain function with fMRI and MEG 
The currently widely available brain imaging methods of fMRI (utilized in Studies I and 
III–V of this thesis) and MEG (in Study II) reveal slightly different properties of brain 
function: fMRI measures the hemodynamic changes reflecting the metabolic demand of 
neural activity, with high spatial sensitivity (Buxton et al., 1998; Logothetis, 2008), 
whereas MEG measures the magnetic fields generated directly by the neuronal activity, 
with high temporal acuity (Hari, 1990; Hämäläinen et al., 1993; Okada et al., 1997). 
Studies I and II of this thesis were designed as complementary views of perceiving 
facial expressions of pain utilizing the strengths of these methods: Study I assessing the 
pain-related activation deeper in the brain, and Study II characterizing the temporal 
processing chain in the cortex. Indeed, the studies did reflect some fundamental 
differences of the methods. 
 With the hemodynamic measures, ACC and AI were found to be more strongly 
activated during observation of intense than mild pain faces (Study I), whereas the MEG 
measures did not show activation of ACC or AI (Study II). The differences may be 
explained by several factors. First, ACC and AI are difficult to detect in MEG 
recordings since both sources are deep in the brain, leading to weaker MEG signals with 
respect to more superficial source of equal strength; according to our simulation, the 
source current in AI has to be 3–4 times stronger than that in more superficial STS to 
produce an MEG response of the same magnitude. Second, the ACC is a symmetric 
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brain structure, which leads to signal cancellation from synchronous but opposite 
currents in nearby cortical walls. Third, some currents in the insula are radial with 
respect to the skull surface, which hinders their visibility in MEG (Hämäläinen et al., 
1993). The poor detectability of insular responses in MEG has been also demonstrated 
by studies of acute pain, where the same painful stimulus evoked AI activation in fMRI 
measurements (Raij et al., 2005), whereas the MEG responses were adequately 
explained by activation of the SII cortex (Forss et al., 2005). 
 With the neuromagnetic measures of Study II, the temporal progression of cortical 
visual processing of facial expressions of pain was obtained, and additionally, a quick 
repetition suppression of the STS responses was detected, whereas no similar effect 
were obtained in the fMRI measurements of Study I. Of course, Study I was designed to 
exclude the basic face processing responses including STS activity, but since the fMRI 
data analysis involved averaging the stimulus-locked data over several repetitions, it is 
likely that the sort of adaptation observed in the MEG data would have gone unnoticed 
and merely reduced the signal. 
 Thus, the results obtained in this thesis suggest that fMRI and MEG provide 
complementary information under certain circumstances. If a neural event is highly 
synchronous but short-lived causing no extensive demand for the metabolism, or if it 
involves fast changes in the response pattern, it may be visible with MEG but not fMRI. 
Additionally, if a neural source is deep in the brain, has highly symmetrical anatomy or 
is radial with respect to the skull surface, it may be detected with fMRI but not with 
MEG. 
 
6.5.2  Effects of data presented with statistical maps 
Due to the arbitrary units obtained by the technique, the results of fMRI studies are 
commonly given in the form of contrast voxel maps thresholded at a certain statistical 
level, as was done in Studies I and III–V of this thesis. Although these maps illustrate 
statistical differences between experimental situations and do not directly reveal the 
amount of firing or synaptic activity of neurons, the map form affects its interpretation. 
Since the maps always involve an amount of uncertainty, also the data presented in this 
thesis only represent one interpretation of the results. 
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 FMRI studies with contrast maps (experimental condition 1 vs. experimental 
condition 2) often include lists of peak coordinates of activation, as in Studies I and  
III–V of this thesis, within the standardized coordinate systems such as Talairach or 
MNI space. While the coordinates are important for forming a basis for across-studies 
comparison, the clusters of activations that survive corrections can be quite large, 
extend over several gyri in the brain and include more than one submaximal focus area, 
which renders peak coordinates a rough simplification of the data.  
 In some brain areas — especially primary sensory cortices — it is justified to assume 
the neuronal activity to be local and very specialized for a certain function, but the level 
of specialization may decrease within the brain regions with higher-order evaluative 
functions, such as those related to social cognition. However, the presentation of the 
results in the form of statistical maps leads thinking into all-or-none patches regardless 
of the brain area, such as “that region is” and “the next region isn’t” involved in 
processing a certain feature, although the extent of a significantly activated region may 
depend on the cut-off value of the statistical threshold, the number of subjects, as well 
as the possible smoothing. Some of the pitfalls of the statistical contrast maps are 
avoided in resolving voxel-based activation patterns including submaximal responses: 
the approach provide small-scale patternal information of brain activation, which is 
more detailed than the large-scale regional data obtained by the traditional contrast 
maps (e.g. Haxby et al., 2001; Staeren et al., 2009; Op de Beeck, 2010). 
 
6.5.3  Comparison of the social neuroscience data from different species 
The studies on sensory mirroring (such as in Study I) commonly scrutinize brain 
responses while subjects experience something themselves and when they perceive the 
same experiences of another person. This kind of experimental setup enables resolving 
whether the same brain regions are activated in both situations, similarly to the original 
motor mirror-neuron experiments with single-cell recordings on monkeys (Gallese et 
al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). However, the monkey studies address the function of 
individual neurons, showing that the same cells respond both to action execution and 
perception, whereas the human noninvasive brain imaging reaches the level of larger 
brain areas. Currently, only one experiment exists showing that a subset of neurons 
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within SMA and hippocampus respond to both observation and execution of grasping 
actions and facial expressions (Mukamel et al., 2010). A part of these neurons showed 
excitation during action execution and inhibition during action observation, suggesting a 
mechanism for distinction between self and others during motor mirroring. However, no 
single-cell data are available from human inferior frontal or parietal mirror-neuron 
areas, thus it is unresolved whether exactly the same neurons respond both to 
observation and execution of an action in these areas, or whether the neurons are 
separate but located in the same area and adjacent to one another. 
 Additionally, there are no current data of sensory mirroring in monkeys similar to the 
results obtained with neuroimaging studies of humans (as in Study I), thus it is not 
known whether such sensory mirroring mechanisms exists in other animals. However, 
behavioral data suggests that prosocial behavior through emotion transfer and emotional 
empathy mechanisms, reminding those of humans (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1983; Eisenberg 
et al., 1994; Farver & Branstetter, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1996), also exist in other 
mammals, such as monkeys (Masserman et al., 1964), chimpanzees (O'Connell, 1995), 
and rats (Church, 1959; Rice & Gainer, 1962). 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
The studies comprising this thesis focused on the perception of facial and bodily 
gestures and movements, which are not classically defined within the range of 
pancultural emotional expressions and thus have previously remained under marginal 
scientific focus. Taken together, these studies clarified the roles of distinct cortical and 
subcortical brain regions in perceiving and sharing others’ internal states, as well as the 
connection of brain responses to behavioral attributes. 
 More precisely, the studies demonstrated 1) the modulation of the cortex around 
superior temporal sulcus in response to both static and dynamic gestural stimuli (Studies 
II–V), 2) the recruitment of the brain areas, which in previous literature have been 
associated with painful experiences, also by observation of the same experiences from 
another’s facial expressions (Study I), and 3) the association of behavioral attributes 
with certain features of the brain responses (Studies I–IV). Study I used behavioral 
attributes to scrutinize the connection of the estimated intensity of observed pain, as 
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well as the connection of the subjective empathy measures, with brain hemodynamic 
responses during pain observation (in AI/ACC regions). Behavioral attributes were also 
utilized in obtaining a similar decrease of both the estimates of pain intensity and the 
neuromagnetic brain responses to pain expressions (in STS regions, Study II); in 
obtaining a negative correlation of the yawning contagiousness, measured by subjects’ 
tendency to yawn, and brain hemodynamic activation (in amygdala, Study III); and in 
obtaining the effects of expertise in the behavior of another species to the hemodynamic 
brain responses (in pSTS–LO, Study IV). 
 These studies associate large-scale brain responses with perceptual observations of 
social stimuli as well as subjects’ behavioral characteristics. In the future, the plasticity 
and individual tuning of social responses require more detailed examination. 
Furthermore, the knowledge of the interplay between brain areas under social settings 
becomes of even more importance, along with simultaneous measurements of 
autonomic nervous system and brain function. Finally, the challenging future topic for 
study is to examine brain activation in more natural and salient settings involving real-
time interaction of two individuals. 
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